

Review

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February 16, 1953



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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Issue of Ideas

by Francis H. Russell

International aggressions in recent times have been carried out on four fronts: political, economic, military, and ideological. This is true of the current Communist attack upon the free world.

In the *political* area we have seen the Communist seizure of power in the Eastern European countries through occupation by Soviet troops immediately following World War II; the pressures against Turkey beginning in 1946; the *coup* in Czechoslovakia in 1948; and the continuing efforts to render the United Nations impotent by the misuse of the veto and by constant harangues for propaganda purposes.

In the *economic* field we have witnessed Communist efforts to disrupt Europe economically and to frustrate the Marshall Plan by such things as the calling of nation-wide strikes in 1947; the attempt to strangle Berlin in 1948-49 through a blockade; and the theft of properties in eastern Austria.

In the *military* area there have been the Kremlin's effort to take over Iran in 1945; the Communist guerrilla warfare against Greece in 1947; the Communist conquest of the mainland of China by force of arms from 1945 to 1949; the guerrilla warfare against Indochina; and the assault upon the Republic of Korea that is going on at the present.

In the *psychological* arena, the Kremlin has made every effort to crack the unity of the free world and the internal unity of each of its members. It has sought on the one hand to fan the legitimate aspirations of the underdeveloped and colonial areas of the world into self-consuming flames, and on the other to play upon the world-wide hopes for peace.

What Is the "Hate America" Campaign?

Most recently we have the "Hate America" move, the tempo of which steadily increased after the 1951 speech of Pospelov on the anniversary of Lenin's death, and which has now revealed itself in all its full violence.

What is this "Hate America" campaign? What does it signify? In the past, Soviet propaganda refrained from attacking the American people and their institutions *as a whole*. They lashed out at Wall Street, at our free labor unions, our press, and the State Department, and other groups of Americans, but they concentrated on them one at a time. And all the while they have insisted that they have an affection for Americans in general.

But now, beginning with their propaganda about germ warfare and atrocities, they have loosed an unprecedented flood of lies, distortions, and vituperation against the American Government, our armed forces, our political system, business, labor, journalism, art, youth—everything Americans represent and respect. As a straw in this gale, the magazine *Young Bolshevik* alleges "the torture of Communists by Americans by throwing them onto burning coals. Often their skin had been cut to shreds and their wounds filled with salt." In the face of such statements, what is the value of the denial by Soviet propagandists that they are engaging in a "Hate America" campaign? The alleged distinction between "good" and "bad" Americans, between "American imperialists," and "rank and file Americans" stands exposed to the world as a sham. Anyone can see that the Kremlin's propaganda specialists are in effect engaged in all-out psychological aggression against the entire American people and all of our institutions.

The ideological front has thus, for the moment, assumed the center of the stage. Not that the economic, the political, and the military fronts are any less important than they were 6 months ago. But perhaps the Kremlin feels it has been temporarily stalemated in its conquest of Korea by the U.N. measures of collective security; on the political front by the emerging strength of NATO in Western Europe and the progressive implementation of the San Francisco pacts in the Pacific area; and on the economic front by the production of the free world—more than twice that of the Iron Curtain countries.

Even so, how are we to explain the "Hate America" move?

The most obvious explanation is that the law of diminishing returns has set in on the Soviet hate propaganda and driven its authors to increase its virulence to this ultimate in shrillness and venom. Another possibility is that they are preparing Soviet public opinion for some future aggressive action.

Whatever its motivation, the principal byproducts of the "Hate America" campaign are clear. It shows the hypocrisy of such things as the Communists' "peace campaigns," their "world economic conference," and their protestations of the possibility of "amicable coexistence" of Communist ambitions and democratic freedom. As Secretary Acheson has said, it casts a bright light on "the fundamental hostility which is the concrete reality we must start with in thinking about foreign policy today."

We Must Know the Nature of Our Problem

It is of the first importance for us to know whether the struggle we are waging in this middle of the twentieth century is against something in the nature of another Fascist dictatorship, an old-fashioned nationalist imperialism, a "new brand of civilization," a personal dictator, or something else. If we are faced, for instance, merely with old-fashioned Russian imperialism or if we are up against a Russian-speaking Mussolini, much that we are doing makes no sense.

We must know the nature of our problem in order to make sure that all we do contributes to a forward movement by the forces of democracy. The penalty of an error in this respect is that our whole strategy and effort will be misdirected and wasted.

It has been a little over a century since Marx and his fellow Communists launched the "religion of hate" with the cry, "A specter is haunting Europe."

It was at almost exactly the same time that a man of the American frontier was saying (if I may shorten and paraphrase it slightly):

By the best cultivation of the physical world around us and the intellectual and moral world within us, we shall secure an individual, social, and political prosperity, a free society, constantly labored for, and, even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, constantly deepening its influence, augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people everywhere.

Thus, a century ago, Marx and Lincoln were defining the issue of the two ways of life which today are in mortal conflict.

A generation has passed since communism first seized the power of government in any country. It has been a decade since the Soviet Union came into control of satellite countries in Eastern Europe. It is fair at this time, therefore, for the world to draw its conclusions about the theory of communism and its practice.

A merely emotional revulsion is not enough. Today, not only a respect for the opinion of mankind but the exigencies of our cause require us to clarify, for all to see, the two competing concepts of society. We must expose the exact nature of communism while we make clear the nature of democracy.

This task is more difficult than would at first appear because the preservation and carrying forward of democracy is not only a *continuing* struggle—it is a continually *changing* struggle. The threat each generation faces is a new threat.

We must, of course, read what Isaiah, Pericles, Cicero, Milton, and Locke have to tell us. They and the other framers of the democratic approach have laid the foundations. But we shall not find the precise answers to our problems even in their writings.

Jefferson and Lincoln clarified the democratic principle in terms of the task of their times. They did not, because in the nature of the situation they could not, marshal the case against democracy's present enemies. The issues of their times are only in the broadest way the issues of our times. We shall have to be our own philosophers.

To Understand—Search for the Communists' Goal

To understand Communist theory, search first for the Communists' goal, because Communist theory is not the path which leads to the Communist goal. It is instead a cloak to provide an aura of moral and intellectual respectability for the goal.

The Marxists' goal is to destroy all existing political societies as we have known them. This ultimate in revolutionary objectives was the answer of a group of neurotics to society's problems of their time, or, more exactly, to the psychological problems of the individuals who propounded and took up the idea.

So it is no surprise to find that the Communist creed has many of the characteristics of a Rube Goldberg invention operating in a world without gravity, substance, or time; or, in the case of Communist theory, without regard to the march of history, the present state of world society, or the needs and wants of living human beings. World-wide revolutionary action is justified by a theory of class war; the class war is supported by an economic theory of surplus value; this, by an economic interpretation of history; this, by the Hegelian dialectic; and the dialectic by a metaphysical concept glorifying the social entity over the individual.

The Communists say the accumulation of capital, in the form of labor-saving devices, reduces the use of human labor and thus increases the profits of the capitalists. Capitalists will continue to exploit the workers by holding their wages down to the subsistence level. The workers, however, who eventually will comprise more and more

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of the population, will become increasingly miserable and will finally combine to destroy the whole system.

The interest of mankind is equated with that of the proletariat, which in turn is equated with that of the Communist Party and this with the interests of the Soviet Union—but all only as interpreted by the Politburo.

The Communist Party has fashioned its propaganda to appeal to a wide variety of disparate elements: the embittered and ruthlessly ambitious; the victims of discrimination, injustice, and oppression; the desperately impoverished; the insecure and uncertain; the lonely, the fearful, and discouraged; those who are tired of having to make their own decisions and who yearn for easy answers to complex problems; those who are dissatisfied with their lot because of monotony or lack of opportunity or purpose in life; political adventurers looking for a vehicle to carry them to power; the inadequately intellectual who are attempting to bridge the gap between thought and "real life"—all who, for one reason or another, are prepared to desert reality and follow a mirage.

In an industrial world, where the individual is in danger of becoming a constantly smaller and less significant part of the whole, in a world of war and the threat of war, freedom may seem to some at times to be a burden, a symbol of the sense of insecurity. Communism provides a delusively easy answer to the need to believe, to find a purpose in life, to belong and feel integrated into a community, to act within a purposeful and efficient framework. The net result is the creation of a mass of robots and fanatics, totally dependent upon the Party.

We are indebted to the Communists for having proved that a dictatorship even "of the proletariat" is no different in its results from any other dictatorship. The stream of thousands upon thousands of Eastern Europeans, who can no longer stand the strain upon their minds and souls, who have left everything and fled to liberty, is eloquent testimony to this truth.

We were warned long ago that to put political power in the hands of men embittered by whatever cause is "to tie firebrands to foxes and to turn them loose amid the standing corn." The answer to the problems of embittered men is not to attempt to disemitter them by placing the world's fate in their hands but to carry on with the age-long task of removing sanely, and as far as possible, the conditions that were the cause.

What has happened when such men with such theories have seized power in a country?

It would perhaps not be fair to compare what the Communist movement has accomplished since the 1840's with what American democracy has accomplished in the same time, although it might be pertinent to point out that democracy has succeeded in doing one thing that communism has never succeeded in doing. It has convinced the

people of many nations of the worth of its principles. No people has ever freely adopted the Communist way of life.

Life in the U.S.S.R.

But what has happened under communism?

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. "guarantees" to its citizens: "payment for work in accordance with output"; "rest and leisure" and "education"; equality of rights "between women and men" and "irrespective of nationality or race"; freedom "of religious worship, of speech, of the press, and to unite in public organizations"; "inviolability of the person and of the homes of citizens."

What is the Soviet record on these "guarantees"?

What, for instance, has happened to "the right to payment for work"? Does the Soviet worker get fair payment for his work? Well, the average city worker in the Soviet Union gets a pound of butter for 5½ hours of work; it takes a half hour of work in the United States. A cotton dress takes 42½ hours of work in the Soviet Union, 2 hours in the United States. A pair of men's shoes, 66 hours in the Soviet Union; 4 hours in the United States. A quart of milk, one hour in the Soviet Union; 8 minutes in the United States. A six-tube radio, 275 hours in the Soviet Union; 18½ hours in the United States. The average farmer in the Soviet Union fares even worse.

In its early days, Soviet communism held out the promise of narrowing the wide spread between incomes of high-paid and low-paid workers. Not only has that promise not been kept, but the spread is increasing each year; today the spread in production workers' wage rates is almost twice as great in the Soviet Union as in America, due in part to the existence of forced labor there. Forced labor, of course, has a depressive effect on the wages of other labor. As a result, the average Soviet worker has to work more hours for the means to buy his food and other commodities than workers in nearly any other industrialized country.

What has happened to "rest and leisure"? The average Soviet family lives in a single room. The average per capita dwelling space is little more than 3.5 square meters, the size of an average prison cell.

What has happened to "the right to education"? Universal elementary education has long been one of the most widely publicized features of the Soviet system. And yet, compared with 1939, when 34 million students attended school in the Soviet Union, today, despite the fact that there has been an increase of over 20 million in the total Soviet population, there are only 33 million in school. About 10 million youth of school age (24 percent of the total) are not in school.

What has happened to equality of rights of women with men? Here the Communists have

passed their goal. They are more than "equal." No work is considered too strenuous for the Soviet woman. She works as a stevedore, on road gangs, on construction crews, on railroad repair crews, in coal mines; she digs subways, logs timber, chops ice off the streets, stokes blast furnaces, puddles steel, and acts as a porter. An advertisement in one of the Communist countries recently stated that day nurseries would be kept open until 11 p. m. so that working women could leave their children until that hour.

What about equality of rights irrespective of nationality or race? Many reports, which unfortunately there are ample grounds for believing, indicate that these "rights" are no more observed in the Soviet Union than they are under other totalitarian regimes.

What about freedom of religious worship, of speech, of the press, the inviolability of the person and of the homes of citizens? They exist only as the butts of grim Iron Curtain humor. One Soviet citizen in every six is an informer for the state. Informers are recruited by suddenly bringing ordinary people before the police, charging them with some infraction of the law, and giving them a choice of disappearing from society or informing on their families, associates, and neighbors. Citizens in a Communist state are afraid to speak freely even in their own families; parents are informers against their own children and vice versa.

What about the rights of labor? With a few exceptions, the labor legislation of the satellites has either provided for or resulted in the following: (1) labor conscription; (2) transfer of workers against their will and freezing of workers to their jobs; (3) prohibition of strikes; (4) punishment of absenteeism; (5) rigid labor discipline; (6) widespread use of speed-up devices; (7) subordination of trade-unions to the government and the Communist Party; (8) elimination of genuine collective bargaining; (9) forced labor; and (10) the exploitation of youth.

What have the Communists done to eliminate class distinction? The answer is that the great inequalities in Soviet incomes have created a privileged class: privileges, for instance, in educational preferences granted to children of Party and military leaders.

A sales tax, the object of so much indignant wrath in Communist writings in other countries, constitutes the Soviet Government's primary source of revenue. It is called a "turn-over tax." It applies even to food. And, although the differences in income in the U.S.S.R. today are very great, the income tax is only slightly graduated. The maximum surtax is 13 percent, even for the highest incomes.

What about "inviolability of the person"? Forced labor, without preliminary formal trial, takes place not only in the Soviet Union but in the satellite countries as well.

What about "freedom to unite in organiza-

tions"? There are no trade-unions in the U.S.S.R. in any real sense of the word. The labor organizations which exist can do nothing toward higher wages, shorter hours, or other improvements in working conditions. They are instruments of the government and therefore have no recourse against the exploitation of the worker by the government.

Someone may, of course, point out that the Soviets would have been able to provide a higher standard of living for their people if they had not devoted so much of their industrial output to preparation for war. This may be so. The world will never know, but the essence of Soviet policy seems to have been to give priority to aggression rather than to a better life.

Some Communist Contradictions

In one of its products communism has excelled; it has produced more contradictions than any other way of life.

To summarize, here are some of them:

Soviet communism states that its goal is the improvement of the condition of the masses; yet economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union are among the worst in the world.

It says that imperialism is an inevitable result of the free way of life; yet it has itself brought more people under subservience in the last 10 years than any other power has ever done in a similar period of time in history, and all this took place while the people of India, Pakistan, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea have been attaining freedom.

It claims to have abolished group prejudices; yet they are more rampant there than in any other place in the world today.

It accuses other countries of being warlike; yet Soviet-supported Communists committed the aggression that brought on the present war in Korea.

It asserts the equality of all men; yet the differentials in pay and privileges under the Soviet system today are greater than in most other countries.

It condemns religion; yet it creates a "religion of hate" more dogmatic than any real religion in the world.

It proclaims a dictatorship of the proletariat; but the dictatorship is that of a small clique enslaving all the people.

It regards nazism as its archenemy and attempts in its propaganda to equate democracy with nazism; yet its own philosophic ancestry has much in common with that of nazism and other totalitarian ideologies.

It predicts the "withering away of the state," while it is in fact creating a monolithic state.

What, then, is Soviet communism?

Its goals are destruction of all existing non-Communist societies and world domination by a small band—not to cure the ills they inveigh against but using them as a means to obtain power.

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Its metaphysics—economic determinism—is a glorification of all material things in life over the things of the spirit.

Its philosophy, under the name of the dialectic, forecasts inevitable and unending conflict and strife.

Its instrument is a dictatorship sustained by the rigors of a police state.

Its strategy consists of aggression, subversion, planned chaos, and confusion.

Its morality is conspiratorial expediency.

Its destiny, if today's free men are equal to their challenge, is merely that of a paragraph in history—a treacherous and costly eddy along the edge of the main stream of civilization—a movement that began as a shout of wrath at the injustices of the middle-nineteenth century and, because of its twisted philosophy, wound up as the creator of infinitely greater injustices in the middle of the twentieth century.

Let us make note that in a very real sense there is an element of hope in all this. Regardless of what actual drives for power are at work in the minds of the men in the Kremlin, their claims have had to be on the score of providing a better life for the world's people. That is a battleground which we could not better have chosen. It is in the main line of our steady advance. It is a field in which we were operating long before Marx was born.

Our Approach to Human Society

Look, for example, through our State Constitutions. You find phrases like these again and again:

All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority.

All men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights.

Among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labors, and the pursuit and obtaining of happiness.

Our national life has been primarily devoted to making a reality of these words.

The authors of these Constitutions had their eyes, not upon creating some all-powerful entity, but upon the individual and the kind of political order that would best promote his good, because they knew that the interests of society are the sum of the interests of those who comprise its citizenry.

Therefore, it is not surprising that we can find today an American business magazine telling of a current constant approach toward these goals which, be it noted, lie in the field of Marx' *purported* interest:

Every year we are adding to the store of knowledge which enables us to progress further and further toward these goals of democracy. We have found that the "happiness" our Constitution writers talked about is, in part, a matter of horizon. A worker must be an intelligent factor in the process of which he is a part, must join the

enterprise system, become an enterpriser. The basic principle in the industrial process must be the principle of participation.

Our approach to human society is by no means fully known abroad. Perhaps the misconception about the United States that is most prevalent is that we are crass, hard, despiritualized, materialistic, irreligious. The Soviet Union, which glorifies materialism, has been most active in its devious ways in promoting this misconception. So let us be alert to deal with it.

The Religious Spirit of America

We might refer to de Tocqueville, most perceptive of commentators upon American life (to paraphrase again slightly):

If any hold that the religious spirit is the very thing most amiss in America, I can only reply that those who hold this language have never been in America and that they have never seen a religious or a free nation.

The Americans profess their religion without shame and without weakness. The head as well as the heart brings them to the foot of the altar.

Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their institutions. The Americans combine religion and liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive the one without the other.

I do not know whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion—for who can search the human heart?—but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion belongs to the whole nation, to every rank of society.

They know that when religion is destroyed, doubt gets hold of the higher powers of the intellect and half paralyzes all others. Men cannot abandon their religious faith without a kind of aberration of intellect and a sort of violent distortion of their true nature. Such a condition cannot but enervate the soul, relax the springs of the will, and prepare the people for servitude.

That was a century ago. What about religion in current American life? The two candidates for the highest office in our land recently gave their views.

One said:

You can't explain free government in any other terms than religious. The founding fathers had to refer to the Creator in order to make their revolutionary experiment make sense; it was because "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights" that men could dare to be free.

Said the other:

While a man's personal religious beliefs have no proper place in our political life . . . Christian faith has been the most significant single element in our history and our tradition. From the beginning it has been the most powerful influence in our national life . . . Religious faith remains our greatest national resource . . . though there are many who find it difficult to give formal expression to that faith.

We hear sometimes about the need of a modern "dynamic." If there is any force from the beginning of recorded time to the present moment that is entitled to be characterized as "dynamic," it is

man's age-long progress toward a society that will be just, free, and peaceful—enabling every individual to fulfill his innermost needs. The “dynamics” today are on countless fronts where the democratic process is at work, not in the slave camps of Siberia.

Back of the “Hate America” campaign are fears and resentments arising out of an awareness that American democracy has surged far forward in achieving the better life which the Communists can only promise, and also out of the fact that our Government has become the free world's center of resistance against the encroachments of the Kremlin's aggressive imperialism.

We are a living, dynamic refutation of Communist theories. No wonder they hate us! Few furies equal those of fanatical theorists whose theories have been proved false.

It was at one time held that progress was inevitable. In recent times that idea has been discredited. But in a basic sense it is true, true be-

cause man's basic nature embodies a drive for growth, for movement forward.

There have been heartbreaking set-backs during the past decade, but in spite of them there are more people in the world today living in independent countries, with higher standards of living and a better hope of achieving the blessings of life, than ever before in the history of the world.

The fight for democracy, however, is never finally won, just as it can never be wholly lost, because it is, in the end, nothing more nor less than a constant striving toward a fuller life for all. The preservation of this way of life, the providing of an opportunity for it to demonstrate its worth, is the basic objective of American foreign policy.

• *Mr. Russell, author of the above article, is now Counselor of the U. S. Embassy at Tel Aviv, Israel. His article is based on an address which he made in his former capacity as Director of the Office of Public Affairs before the Eastern States Conference on Religion and the Nation's Problems at Washington on Oct. 17, 1952.*

Information and U.S. Foreign Policy

by Wilson Compton

Administrator, International Information Administration¹

I am asked to talk with you this afternoon about a public information service which you never see, and seldom hear, in the United States. It is America's most significant single undertaking in public education. You never see it or hear it because what it says, is said overseas, and what it does, it does overseas. But it is “talking” every day to millions of men and women in 100 countries around the world. Those of you who know it at all know it perhaps as the Voice of America. Literally, it includes an international broadcasting service daily in 46 languages with potential listening audiences in 100 countries; a press service reaching nearly 10,000 foreign newspapers each day; a motion-picture service which last year had a total audience of over 300 million people; an exchange-of-persons program which each year brings thousands of selected foreign students, teachers, scientists, writers, artists, journalists, farmers, labor leaders, and specialists to the United States and sends half as many selected

Americans overseas; and U. S. information centers in more than 190 cities in over 60 countries. As a part of the American “Crusade of Ideas,” the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, as it is called in the Act of Congress, is around the world one of the most potent barriers between “cold war” and “hot war.”

Information in other countries is accepted as a function of government in its foreign relations. Yet it has no firm place in the tradition of America or in the thinking of Americans. The historic Voice of America, which over the years had built abroad great reservoirs of respect and good will for the United States, has been normal trade, travel, immigration, emigration, ordinary communications, and our great missionary enterprises of the last century. Some of these voices have been quieted. Some have been interrupted by the events of two world wars. In some places these reservoirs of good will have been largely drained and supplanted by suspicions, mistrusts, and now even “hates” fostered by the propaganda of an international communism, lusty for aggression and subversion, which shrinks from no political im-

¹ Address made before the Congressional Club, Washington, D. C., on Jan. 30 (press release 57).

morality. Yet America is still the world's greatest symbol of faith and hope, and around the world there are millions of men and women who every day are looking anxiously, but hopefully, for the signs of what Winston Churchill, during the dark days of Britain, referred to as the "light in the West."

We do, of course, regard the hateful and immoral propaganda of international communism as a diabolical menace to democratic political institutions and free society the world over. But I doubt that we, as a nation, are taking seriously the "cold war" as a potential means of averting a "hot war," or that as a people we are as yet really trying to win the "cold war." We are, to be sure, relying on armaments and armies to win a hot war if a hot war comes. But winning a hot war, which leaves a cold war unwon, will not win very much for very long.

The USIS and VOA Around the World

Our present facilities for the "war of ideas" should enable us to retard the advance of international communism, dull the edge of its propaganda, and help to give the free world a breathing space. This itself is important. But it will not win the cold war. Nor will even larger facilities, and larger funds, enable us to win it until as a nation, or mutually with other nations, we can couple what we say more effectively with what we are able to do overseas. All information service overseas, or "propaganda" if you prefer that term, however skillful it may be, will not be effective by itself alone. But it can be made a mighty fortress of foreign policy.

The job of what often is called "public information" or "public education" is difficult everywhere. You and I know how difficult it is for any of us to keep informed about what is going on in the world or, for that matter, even here at home. Yet there are available to us everywhere in the United States everyday extensive means of information—books, newspapers, radio, television, motion pictures, libraries. These are not provided by our Government. They are provided by the enterprise of our people. But no comparable facilities are available to us overseas. So if we want to carry the Voice of America around the world, we must to a large extent provide the facilities ourselves. That is what we are doing through the International Information Administration, and in certain crucial areas by the Mutual Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. But we should never cease the effort to restore the normal Voice of America through ordinary trade, travel, communications, and intercourse between nations and peoples which nowadays is so sadly interrupted by the conflicts of ideologies which plague the world.

Consider for a moment the job of reaching people around the world, reaching not 160 million

Americans who speak one language, but some 2 billion people who in the aggregate speak over 200 languages, half of them unable to read any language. This is a rather formidable educational enterprise. It takes trained men, and there are not enough of them. It takes money, but not as much as some enthusiasts say. It takes time and planning; and it will take a lot of patience on the part of Americans who are accustomed to tackling a job and getting it over with quickly. The world-wide war of ideas is not that kind of a job. And yet it is the most potent single barrier between "cold war" and "hot war."

In the overseas information program, we must overcome not only the problems of distance and the perplexities of diverse languages, but the unfamiliar customs, strange traditions, and innumerable creeds which so dominate the lives of peoples throughout the world. Some people, for example, hold the cow to be sacred. We use the cow to provide us with meat. Some people prepare their entire lives for a single journey to Mecca. We go to church on Sundays. Others till the soil by scratching it with a pointed stick. We do it with mighty machines. In most countries of the world, for us to be understood at all, we must speak to their peoples in their own terms, in their own images, and, so far as possible, through their own voices. This is not a simple enterprise.

To get the context of this complex job of telling abroad the story of America's purposes, policies, hopes, and motives and especially its interest as a "good neighbor" in promoting peace, freedom, and the sense of mutual security, one must go into other countries and talk with their people. This I have just done in a 21,000-mile trip of inspections and conferences around the world. These consultations have covered more than 50 countries. Our overseas information program, I might say, is not as good as its most enthusiastic supporters claim; it is not as bad as its principal critics say, and it is making steady progress. If we are not winning the "cold war," we are at least not losing it, and time and the truth are on our side.

I have been looking into the nooks and crannies of the U.S. Information Service and the Voice of America around the world. We now have an information service on the spot in 88 countries, great and small. In the countries behind the Iron Curtain, we have no dependable means of reaching their peoples except by radio—the "Voice of America"—or at the fringes occasionally by printed information which, so to speak, "leaks" across the border. Elsewhere, we are relying on the printed page, motion pictures, information centers, exchanges of persons, or radio—whatever means of communication in each country are the best suited.

It is of no value to rely on books and pamphlets to reach peoples who cannot read, or on American books in English to persons who do not know

English, or on radio programs, however excellent, to people who have no radios or who cannot hear our signal. The means of reaching the minds of the literate French, confident of their own long history and proud of their own culture, are quite different from the means of reaching the people of Indonesia, struggling with the problems and opportunities of a new independent and determined, but inexperienced and suspicious nationalism.

Establishing a More Positive Program for VOA

We are now in the midst of a formidable world-wide effort to establish a more positive program of the Voice of America overseas—in short, to take the *offense* in the “war of ideas.” No baseball game is ever won merely by good fielding. Nor is any war, hot or cold, won merely by a good defense. Country by country, throughout the world, we are now setting up individual information programs related to local facts, local conditions, and local opportunities. These programs are initiated by our own missions in each country—subject to review by Washington—to assure that what we do overseas is properly within the framework of U.S. policy. But the initiative is overseas, the country planning is overseas, the tactics and strategy are determined overseas.

This is the most formidable undertaking in the short history of our foreign information program—to put responsibility and authority where it will count for the most, namely, on the “firing line” overseas. I am confident that it will double the effectiveness of our national investment in this world-wide program, whatever that investment may be. To do this, we must have public-affairs officers in each country competent and willing to accept responsibility and to take an initiative, who see in this “crusade of ideas” not a job but a mission, not a chore but a challenge, not a duty, only, but an opportunity to help find the way to lasting peace in the only way it can be found—through attitudes and ideas, not through armies and guns.

In this foreign information service we have men and women like that overseas. No one of you could have gone with me during these recent weeks and talked with our public-affairs officers and their staffs, literally around the world, without a sense of pride in the competence, the zeal, and the devotion of these public servants. Some are living in places where it is easy to live and are working in congenial surroundings. But some are living in places where it is difficult for Americans to live—sometimes even dangerous. Some are working in indifferent, suspicious, or even hostile surroundings. There are some weak spots in the program which must be fortified. But we know where they are and we are doing something to correct them.

Our motion-picture service is especially useful in countries with a high degree of illiteracy. We are showing motion pictures in 43 languages.

We are using hundreds of mobile units. In Thailand, in company with Siamese officials, I visited a mobile library and small motion-picture room mounted on a riverboat which goes hundreds of miles up the river to communities whose people have never seen a movie and never touched a book. This year we will have distributed overseas 2 billion pieces of printed materials, most of it adapted to the individual countries where they are to be used. More and more in this enterprise we are, so-to-speak, using the “rifle” instead of the “shotgun.”

Our information centers, translations of good American books into local languages, and the exchange-of-persons program are, in general, the least controversial of our overseas activities. Last month, just before Christmas, I visited our modest information center on a prominent corner in Vienna. It was crowded—overcrowded. I saw two young men, who couldn't find a place to sit down, using the wall as a “table” on which to copy from some well-thumbed magazines. During that day, 3,851 persons used that U.S. Information Center. A few blocks distant, the Soviet Union had a large building housing the Soviet Information Service in Vienna. At the top of the building was a huge electric-lighted sign with a slogan in German: “How the Soviet Union is remaking the world.” Its library and exhibits were attractive; the attendants were courteous. But there were fewer than 40 in the library. Strangely, the wide street in front of the Soviet Information Center that very day was being taken over as a market for the sale of Christmas trees—a curious paradox.

The “Poster War” in Vienna

Incidentally, that sense of humor is getting quite a play in the “poster war” now going on in Vienna. The Communists will put up a large poster; the typical Austrian technique is to “slap on” two or three pieces of paper which will completely change the meaning of the poster.

For example, a Soviet poster will show an American tank crushing the Austrian people. The slogan reads, “TODAY SALZBURG, TOMORROW ALL OF AUSTRIA.” (Salzburg, as you know, is an American center in Austria.) Shortly after such a Soviet poster appears in the streets of Vienna, the Austrians will make it look like this. A hammer and sickle will change the tank to a Soviet tank crushing the Austrian people. The American center of Salzburg will be changed to the Soviet center of Zistersdorf—the oil town now being exploited by the Soviets.

Now, the poster reads, “TODAY ZISTERSDORF, TOMORROW ALL OF AUSTRIA.”

I can show you another example of the Austrian technique used in this “poster war” with a Soviet poster showing a red train. The slogan says, “FOR LASTING PEACE, COMMUNISM.” It shows communism breaking up atomic diplomacy, the North Atlantic Treaty, et cetera.

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With just two pieces of paper, the Austrians can turn this Soviet poster into anti-Communist propaganda. Slap on a white piece of paper to cover the bottom and put the word "SLAVERY" over the word "PEACE." Now the poster reads, "FOR LASTING SLAVERY, COMMUNISM."

However, this slap-on technique is not limited to anti-Communists in the "poster war." Our posters get hit, too. One such poster, put up by our U.S. Information Service, shows the large Soviet-owned combine called "U-SEE-A" grazing on Austria—and being milked by Moscow. A very effective poster. Shortly after this appeared in the streets of Vienna, a large piece of white paper was plastered over the top to completely blot out the meaning.

We need more book translations in Europe. Even more, we need them in Southeast Asia. Burma is a good illustration. Burma has about 20 million people. It was heavily ravaged during the war. The British left the Burmese a valuable tradition of trained civil service. Rangoon is still filled with pitiful hordes of wartime refugees. Burma has high "sights" for itself, and a spirit of determination. Its government services are dominated by about 40 young men, mostly of ages between 30 and 50 years. Most of them are well-educated—many from the University of Rangoon, whose faculty includes Americans and Burmese of American training. These young men fundamentally like and trust America. They want America's help; but they are next door to the Iron Curtain.

In Rangoon a few weeks ago, I visited two native book shops. One was in a select market area. The other was patronized by the Burmese "man in the street." In both were scores of Communist books and pamphlets—many featuring either Marx, or Lenin, or Stalin—a few featuring Mao Tse-tung. In the first shop, I found on display two American books—both mediocre. In the second shop I found one, and it was not a good one. The Burmese, although timid about us and sometimes a bit skeptical, are basically friendly to the United States. We should do more to keep them so. Good books in their own language, which they can buy at small cost, will help. In the Middle East is another great opportunity for book translations. The newly established Franklin Publications, Inc., a cooperative nonprofit undertaking of patriotic American book publishers, has this year made a start toward meeting the urgent need for inexpensive good American books in the Arab countries. But it is only a start and its enterprise should be extended to Southeast Asia where the need is equally urgent.

The Voice of America, the voice of our International Broadcasting Service, is still our most controversial activity. Yet it is perhaps our most important single service because it is not only the best, but the only dependable means available to us to reach behind the Iron Curtain. RIAS, our

potent radio service in Berlin, is coming close to blanketing Germany, including Communist-controlled East Germany. It is having a powerful political effect. Many hundreds of East Germans daily are escaping to West Germany through Berlin. In December, the rate averaged about 500 a day. On Monday of this week it was over 2,500—another indication of great ferment in Eastern Europe.

During the day that I visited RIAS, 75 East Germans came voluntarily to our station to tell the RIAS staff about the true conditions in East Berlin and in Eastern Germany. This they did at considerable risk. An interesting side light is this: RIAS is officially an activity of the United States. But it is almost universally accepted also as the voice of Free Berlin. There are 600 German employees of the station, but only 8 Americans. I talked to a large number of our staff of Germans. They were almost more resentful than the Americans, themselves, of the "Hate America" propaganda of the East German radio.

The same, on a smaller scale, may be said of our radio enterprise "Red, White, Red" in Vienna, and of the two daily newspapers which we are publishing in Berlin and Vienna, which are generally regarded as among the most influential in Western Europe—influential, I might add, largely because they are detached from local political partisanship. It is a striking commentary on our opportunities in Europe that it is the Germans and the Austrians, and not ourselves, who are the most anxious that we continue these radio and newspaper voices to their own people.

Making Truth a Rule of International Life

The American people I think should, on the whole, be encouraged over our gradual progress in the war of ideas. During the past 2 years, the International Information and Educational Exchange Program has often been referred to popularly as the "Campaign of Truth." That is a significant description. It means a great deal to Americans; and after having talked recently with hundreds of people, official and nonofficial, of other countries around the world, I am persuaded that it means a great deal to them, too. The international Communists are investing in their campaigns of deception and hate more than 10 times as much as we are investing in our Campaign of Truth. If we ourselves have faith and patience we, in cooperation with other free nations, can eventually establish the truth not merely as a symbol, but as a rule of international life. We have a great opportunity and an equal responsibility to provide a leadership, a guidance, and an encouragement to the rest of the world. The President has boldly blazed the way.

Last month with Mrs. Compton, I went to church with the oldest American congregation ever established on foreign soil—the American

Church in Paris. It dates back 100 years. It now occupies a new monumental structure built 20 years ago, of Medieval Gothic—one of the finest products of the genius of the late noted architect, Ralph Adams Cram. On the wall of the chancel, under the beautiful rose window, is painted a figure of the "Great Teacher." Carved under it is this inscription: "And ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free." As we stood there in those historic surroundings, we sang that familiar old hymn, "Teach us the struggles of the soul to bear"—a solemn reminder of the uneasiness, the insecurity, the anxiety, the "struggles of the soul" of the millions of our fellowmen around the world who like ourselves want freedom and want peace.

Whatever the organization, whatever the vehicle, and whatever the auspices of the Voice of America, I hope that it will always be grounded in the truth. In the long run, the truth will be more powerful than any gun.

U.S. Extends Sympathy To Flood Victims

On February 2 President Eisenhower sent cablegrams to the Queen of England, the Queen of the Netherlands, and the King of Belgium expressing U.S. sympathy for suffering caused in their countries by recent floods and hurricanes. On February 6 the White House announced that the President had appointed a special committee to gather facts on the disaster and make appropriate recommendations as to the kind of help to be offered by the United States for relief of the flood victims.

Following are texts of the White House announcement, the President's cablegrams, and the messages sent in reply by Queen Elizabeth of England and Queen Juliana of the Netherlands:

White House Announcement of February 6

At its meeting today the Cabinet expressed a unanimous conviction that the people of the United States want to help the people in the storm-stricken areas in the British Isles and Western Europe.

The President appointed a committee composed of the Secretary of State as chairman, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director for Mutual Security, to get together the facts on the storm disaster and make appropriate recommendations as to the kind of U.S. help to relieve the sufferings of the victims. The committee will examine the extent to which congressional action may be needed and will fully cooperate with the American Red Cross.

The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, has already instructed our Armed Forces in the British Isles and Western Europe to cooperate with the local authorities in giving

all possible assistance to people in the devastated areas. The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security are in Holland today and will send back to the President further reports on the storm damages.

Text of the President's Cablegrams

White House press release dated February 2

To The Queen of England

My fellow Americans join me in extending to Your Majesty and to the British people heartfelt sympathy for the tragic deaths and sufferings caused by the floods and hurricanes.

To The Queen of The Netherlands

My countrymen and I are deeply shocked at the news of the devastation your people have sustained through the recent storms and floods. They and I wish to extend to Your Majesty our deepest sympathy in these tragic circumstances.

To The King of Belgium

The American people join me in extending to Your Majesty heartfelt sympathy for the tragic suffering your people have sustained in the recent violent storms.

Messages Sent in Reply

From The Queen of England

White House press release dated February 4

PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
White House
Washington, D. C.

I thank you Mr. President for your message of sympathy for the tragic losses which the recent floods have brought to my country. My very deep sympathy is with the relatives and friends of the American servicemen and their families who have lost their lives. We shall remember with gratitude the selfless cooperation of their comrades in the work of rescue and comfort.

ELIZABETH R

From The Queen of The Netherlands

White House press release dated February 5

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, D. C.

I thank you and your countrymen most sincerely for your message and many tokens of sympathy. The quick and efficient American help is of very great value and will never be forgotten.

JULIANA

U.S. Again Asks Hungary To Return Property Seized in 1951 Plane Incident

BACKGROUND FOR CORRESPONDENCE

Press release 59 dated January 31

The U.S. Minister at Budapest, Christian M. Ravndal, on January 30 transmitted a further note to the Hungarian Government concerning the matter of the four American airmen, Capt. Dave H. Henderson, Capt. John J. Swift, Sgt. Jess A. Duff, and Sgt. James A. Elam, who were seized in Hungary in November 1951. Earlier U.S. notes on this subject were delivered to the Soviet and Hungarian Foreign Offices on December 10, 1952,¹ and a further note was delivered on December 17, 1952 to the Soviet Foreign Office.²

The Soviet Government, which had seized the U.S. Air Force C-47 plane 6026 and all its contents when the plane was brought down in Hungary on November 19, 1951, failed to reply to the questions put to it in the U.S. note of December 10, 1952. Instead the Soviet Government referred to the confiscation of the aircraft by the Hungarian authorities in accordance with the judgment of the Budapest military tribunal and returned the note to the American Embassy at Moscow on the ground that it was "incorrectly addressed."³ In order to avoid any possibility that the Soviet Government had not made itself fully aware of the contents of the U.S. note of December 10, that note was again transmitted to the Soviet Government on December 17, the United States specifically pointing out that the December 10 note referred "clearly to instrumentalities of the Soviet Government which were involved in the detention of the United States plane and crew and concerns actions, material, and information which only the Soviet Government can explain or provide." The United States requested that due consideration be given to the December 10 note and that an appropriate reply be transmitted.

On December 20, 1952, the note of December 10 was again sent back by the Soviet Government to

the American Embassy in Moscow with the following statement:⁴

Inasmuch as the Embassy's note of December 17, 1952 touches upon the same question as the note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in the U.S.S.R. of December 10, 1952, which was returned to the Embassy for reasons set forth in the letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Y. A. Malik of December 11, 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not see any reason for new consideration of this question and returns herewith the Embassy's note of December 17 and the Embassy's note of December 10 which was attached to it.

The note delivered to the Hungarian Government on January 30 gives the Hungarian Government an opportunity to return to the United States the airplane and its contents, including the documentary evidence on board, originally seized by the Soviet authorities and indicated by the Soviet Government to have been turned over to the Hungarian Government. At the same time the new note to the Hungarian Government makes it clear, as did the note of December 17 to the Soviet Government, that the liability of the Soviet Government to the United States in connection with this matter will be in no way discharged or diminished by any Soviet action in turning the U.S. property over to Hungarian authorities or by the fact that the United States may seek to recover the property from the Hungarian Government to the extent that that Government may have possession of it.

On January 23, 1953, after the Department's instruction to Minister Ravndal concerning yesterday's note was transmitted to him, but before the note could be communicated to the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian Government delivered to Minister Ravndal a reply to the U.S. note of December 10, 1952. An examination of this Hungarian reply showed that it was not only not responsive to the U.S. note of December 10 but that it contained nothing that would call for any reconsideration of yesterday's note. The December 10 note requested the Hungarian Government to provide the United States with information and other material concerning the detention, arrest, and trial of the four airmen, while the note

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 981.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

delivered yesterday demands the return of the C-47 airplane and its contents to the extent that they may have been turned over to the Hungarian Government by the Soviet Government.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 30

On January 23, 1953, I had the honor to receive from the Deputy Foreign Minister Your Excellency's note 2123/1953 with regard to the continuing interest of the United States Government in the case of the four American airmen who were forced to land in Hungary November 19, 1951. As I orally informed Your Excellency's Deputy at the time, I immediately telegraphed this note to my government. My government does not consider the reply of the Hungarian Government responsive. In the interim I have received instructions to transmit to Your Excellency the following additional communication with reference to my note of December 3, 1952 which I handed to Your Excellency's Deputy on December 10, 1952:

From notes to the Government of the United States of America from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the respective dates of December 11 and December 20, 1952, the United States Government infers that some time after November 19, 1951, the Soviet Government turned over to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic the C-47 type airplane USAF 6026, bearing the identification symbol 43-16026, together with the equipment, cargo, and other contents thereof, to which reference was made in the United States note to the Hungarian Government of December 10, 1952.

1. The Hungarian Government is informed that the aircraft, its equipment, cargo and other contents were at the time of the alleged turning over of them to the Hungarian Government by the Soviet Government, and were at all times theretofore and thereafter, and still are, exclusively the property of the United States Government; that neither the Soviet Government nor the Hungarian Government had any lawful interest therein; that the seizure, detention and disposition thereof by the Soviet Government were entirely without the consent or approval of the United States Government and were, therefore, unlawful; and that the receipt, detention and disposition or use thereof by the Hungarian Government were without the consent or approval of the United States Government and therefore were and are now unlawful. The Hungarian Government is, therefore, requested to make prompt return of all the property to which reference is made or to make prompt provision for the payment of the value thereof, with interest at 6 percent from the date of the acceptance thereof by the Hungarian Government from the Soviet Government, in the event that the return should not for any valid reason be possible. The property consists of the following:

(1) The United States Air Force airplane 6026, C-47 type and its equipment, value \$96,436.40.

(2) Cargo thereof, itemized in the manifests on board the airplane when seized by the Soviet authorities, value \$2,342.89.

Total value \$98,779.29.

2. In particular and apart from the foregoing itemization the United States requests the Hungarian Government to return to it specifically certain articles, property of the United States, which were on board the airplane when it was seized by the Soviet authorities on November 19, 1951, in the event and to the extent that these articles have since come into the possession of the Hungarian Government. These articles are:

(1) Aeronautical charts entitled "World Aeronautical Charts" published by the United States Government, Forms Nos. WAF 230, 231, 252, 253, 320, 321, 343, 423, 424, 425; and two aeronautical planning charts, Nos. 11 and 12.

(2) A Radio Facilities Chart of Europe, published by the United States.

(3) The flight plan, bearing the signatures of the pilot, Captain Dave Henderson, and other United States Air Force personnel.

(4) The navigation log, as filled out by United States Air Force personnel, showing the details of the anticipated flight from Erding, Germany, to Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

(5) AF Form No. 1, being the log of aircraft 6026, showing number of passengers carried, place and time of take-off, landings et cetera, kept by the engineer and the pilot.

(6) AF Form 35, being the log kept by the radio operator, Sergeant James A. Elam, and all notes of the same radio operator, whether or not in the log.

(7) AF Form 75, being the retained copy of the pilot, Captain Henderson, of the clearance form issued by American authorities at Erding, Germany, on the aircraft's leaving that place November 19, 1951, showing the persons carried, the weather briefing, the route to be flown, the estimated time of flight, the amount of fuel carried by the plane and other flight information.

(8) Navigation computer, described as Form E6B.

(9) Pilot's Handbook, published by the United States.

(10) AF Form 15 and pad, showing the condition of the plane on departure.

(11) Leather brief case, called a navigator's kit, and all other contents thereof in addition to those described above.

(12) One portable United States Air Force emergency radio transmitter.

(13) Twenty-one blankets.

3. The Hungarian Government is further informed that should it fail promptly to effect the return of the property requested the United States Government will consider itself entitled to take such substantive action on account of such failure as it may then find appropriate, and also to rely on and produce secondary evidence, to the extent available to the United States, in any proceedings hereafter in which the property, the documents, or the information, as original or best legal evidence, may be relevant. The United States Government reserves the right to proceed upon the premise that return of the articles, so requested and not made, would be unfavorable to the Hungarian Government and the United States Government will consider and contend whenever and

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wherever appropriate that the Hungarian Government should be estopped from producing as evidence in its behalf the original or best legal evidence thus concealed from the United States or from contesting the admissibility or value of the secondary evidence.

4. The United States wishes to make clear that the requests made herein of the Hungarian Government are not intended to condone the illegality of the Soviet Government's conduct with respect to the seizure, detention and disposition of the property in question or to relieve that government from legal liability with respect thereto. The United States wishes also to make clear that the return of the airplane, its equipment and its cargo, or their value, and the documents and other property taken by the Soviet Government in connection therewith, will not be considered by the United States to relieve the Soviet Government or the Hungarian Government in any way of liability for damages caused by either government to the United States or its nationals in this matter and remaining unsatisfied.

5. For the information of the Hungarian Government there are transmitted herewith copies of the United States Government's notes to the Soviet Government of December 10 and December 17, 1952, and copies of the Soviet Government's replies dated December 11 and December 20, 1952, respectively.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

TEXT OF HUNGARIAN NOTE OF JANUARY 23

Following is the substantive portion of the note delivered by the Hungarian Government to Minister Ravndal on January 23:

It is a generally accepted principle of international law that each sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction by way of its own courts, in cases of criminal actions committed within its own territory, be the perpetrators nationals of the respective or of a foreign country. In accordance with this principle paragraph 3 of Law Number 2 of 1950 provides: "Hungarian law is to be applied in case a crime is committed either by a Hungarian or a foreign national within the territory of Hungary." As a consequence of this basic manifestation of sovereignty, the Government of the United States shall not form a right—as it attempts to do in the note referred to above¹—to exercise control on proceedings carried out by a court of the Hungarian Peoples Republic and concluded by a final sentence.

The right of appeal for convicted persons of whatever nationality is guaranteed by the Hungarian laws in force. The convicted American flyers, however, did not avail themselves of the right of appeal in spite of the fact that the court

had drawn their attention to this right, whereby the sentence became final. Consequently it is incomprehensible why the note has asked for the circumstances of the appeal. In this connection I have the honor to invite your attention to paragraph 326 of Law Number 33, of 1912 providing that waiving of the right to appeal means that "no possibilities whatever exist to revoke" this statement.

As Your Excellency's note fails to put forward but a single fact which could in any way challenge the legality of the court's proceedings and as the claims contained in the note are void of any legal basis either of Hungarian or of international law, I on behalf of my government most categorically reject them as an attempt of interference into the sovereignty of Hungary.

U.S. Again Invites U.S.S.R. To Discuss Austrian Treaty

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF JANUARY 28

Press release 53 dated January 28

The U.S. Government through its Embassy in Moscow received a reply on January 27 to its note of January 12.¹ The U.S. note had urged that, in compliance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution of December 20 calling upon the Four Occupying Powers to conclude an Austrian treaty as soon as possible, a meeting of the treaty deputies be held at an early date. Subsequently invitations were issued for such a meeting to be held at London on January 30.

While the text of the Soviet reply was partly garbled in transmission to the Department,² it nevertheless makes clear that Soviet attendance at this meeting is conditional upon the withdrawal of the Western proposal for an abbreviated treaty. Any such proposal should properly be discussed at the meeting. The United States does not feel that any limitation should be placed on the possible means of arriving at a treaty before a meeting is held. As Benjamin V. Cohen, U.S. alternate representative in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly said in the discussion on the Austrian treaty on December 18, 1952, the United States remains "... willing to accept any treaty in terms adequate to insure the restoration of Austria's independence and its freedom from foreign domination."³

There has been no meeting of the treaty deputies since December 1950. The United Nations has called for a "renewed and urgent effort" to con-

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

² A corrected copy was received Jan. 28; see below.

³ For text of Ambassador Cohen's statement and of the U.N. resolution on the Austrian treaty, see BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 67.

¹ I. e., the U.S. note of Dec. 10, 1952.

clude an Austrian treaty. The U.S. deputy will be present in London and this Government continues to maintain its position that it is prepared to discuss any relevant proposal which may lead to a Four Power agreement and thus to a speedy conclusion of an Austrian treaty.

U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 29

The Department announced on January 29 (press release 54) that on that date the American, British, and French Embassies in Moscow delivered to the Soviet Government similar notes indicating that they do not consider it appropriate to impose prior conditions as proposed by the Soviet Government as to the scope of these discussions. The Governments reiterate their readiness to discuss, without prior conditions, any and all matters relevant to the speedy conclusion of a treaty, and to that end the U.S. Government, as chairman, repeats the invitation to the Soviet deputy to attend a meeting on January 30, or if the Soviet Government prefers, will postpone the meeting until February 6. The text of the U.S. note follows:

The United States Government acknowledges the receipt of the Soviet note of January 27 and wishes to reaffirm its desire to comply with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 20, 1952 which called upon the Four Powers to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in her sovereignty.

With this purpose in mind, the United States Government called a meeting of the treaty deputies for January 30 in London in order to conclude an Austrian treaty. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government declares its readiness subject, however, to certain conditions, to take part in a meeting to discuss the Austrian problem. The United States Government for its part does not consider it appropriate to impose prior conditions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, as to the scope of these discussions. It reiterates its readiness to discuss, without prior conditions, any and all matters relevant to the speedy conclusion of a treaty. To that end, it repeats the invitation to the Soviet deputy to attend a meeting on January 30, but is prepared if the Soviet Government should prefer, to postpone the meeting until February 6.

SOVIET NOTE OF JANUARY 27

[Unofficial translation]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., acknowledging receipt of the note of the Government of the U.S.A. of January 12⁴ of this year on

⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

the Austrian question, has the honor to state the following:

In its note the Government of the U.S.A. refers to the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly of December 20, 1952, regarding the Austrian question and to obligations allegedly resulting from this resolution with regard to Austria for each of the Four Powers, the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France. In connection with this, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to call attention to the fact that both raising the question in the United Nations and the resolution adopted on this question are illegal, inasmuch as the Austrian question, in accordance with article 107 of the U.N. Charter does not fall within the competence of the United Nations, but lies exclusively within the competence of the Four Powers—the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France, which took upon themselves the obligations with regard to Austria provided for in agreements concluded among themselves.

As concerns the proposal contained in the U.S. Government's note regarding calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers' deputies on the Austrian question, the Soviet Government, as is known, has already more than once approached the Governments of the U.S.A., England, and France with the proposal to hasten the conclusion of the preparation of a state treaty with Austria on the basis of principles earlier agreed to between the Governments of the Four Powers. In its notes on this question of August 14⁵ and September 27, 1952, the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that the above-mentioned draft state treaty with Austria rests on the Moscow Declaration of 1943 which provides for the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria, and on the Potsdam Agreement of the Four Powers which defined the principles of their general policy with relation to Austria, as well as on decisions concerning Austria on important political and economic questions which were adopted in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France in June 1949.

However, the Government of the U.S.A., as well as the Governments of England and France, evaded the acceptance of the proposal indicated by the Soviet Government, trying to substitute for a state treaty with Austria a so-called "abbreviated treaty" and thus continuing its policy of disrupting the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria.

Meanwhile, the "abbreviated treaty" does not agree with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and with other agreements of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France regarding Austria. The "abbreviated treaty" does not provide for any decisions whatsoever which could promote reestablishment of a really independent and democratic Austrian state. The "abbreviated treaty"

⁵ Ibid., Sept. 1, 1952, p. 322.

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* Ibid.
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also does not assure the Austrian people of democratic rights and freedoms and opens wide scope for restoration of the Fascist regime in Austria and for use of her for purposes of implementation of the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic Organization. In the "abbreviated treaty" the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France completely disregard the obligations regarding German assets in eastern Austria which they took upon themselves in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement.

In this connection, one must also not overlook the fact that the Austrian Government, as is evident from its memorandum of July 31, 1952⁶ and also from official statements of its representatives, opposes the draft state treaty with Austria and fights for the so-called "abbreviated treaty," which, however, can not assist the matter of settling the Austrian question and in no measure whatsoever answers the national interests of the Austrian people.

For the purpose of hastening the conclusion of the treaty with Austria, the Soviet Government has twice—in a note of August 14 and a note of September 17, 1952—expressed its readiness to take part in a meeting of representatives of the Four Powers on the Austrian question. At the same time the Soviet Government considered it necessary to clarify in a preliminary manner whether the Government of the U.S.A., as well as the Governments of England and France, agrees to withdraw its proposal regarding the "abbreviated treaty" for Austria and to affirm its readiness to conclude consideration of the state treaty with Austria.

Up to this time the Soviet Government has not received an answer to this question from the Government of the U.S.A., or from the Governments of England and France. In their notes of January 25 [January 12], the Governments of the U.S.A., England, and France again pass over in silence the above-mentioned question raised by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government, reaffirming its position set forth in notes of January 18,⁷ August 14, and September 27, 1952, again states its readiness to take part in meeting with representatives of the Four Powers on the Austrian question. Moreover, the Soviet Government considers it necessary in a preliminary manner to receive an answer from the Government of the U.S.A., and from the Governments of England and France, to the above-mentioned question regarding their readiness to withdraw the proposal of the "abbreviated treaty" and to conclude consideration of the state treaty with Austria, thus fulfilling obligations taken upon themselves to promote the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria.

Similar notes have also been sent to the Governments of England and France.

North Korean Broadcasts

At a news conference on January 28, Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, in reply to questions concerning a North Korean radio broadcast offering land, money, education, and citizenship to deserters from the Republic of Korea Army, made the following statement:

I have been getting queries concerning some broadcasts from the Korean Communist radio station at Pyongyang. I think their first broadcast on this subject was about January 19 and there have been any number since. That broadcast purported to give the text of a "decision" of the "Military Committee." The broadcast was aimed at persuading the U.N. soldiers, particularly soldiers of the Republic of Korea, to desert. The decision formally promises land, monetary rewards, education, and even citizenship to all who will surrender.

Unable to crack the magnificent Republic of Korea Army by military means, the Communists are attempting to achieve the same end with honeyed words and promises which will certainly not deceive the free men resisting Communist aggression in Korea. This propaganda device offers to prisoners of war treatment that is in glaring contrast to the stand taken formerly by the Communist authorities in Moscow and their mouthpieces in Peiping and Pyongyang. This stand, of course, has been that all prisoners must be repatriated, by force if necessary. In effect, the broadcast says clearly that those who surrender will not be repatriated, that they will be welcomed into "citizenship" in the Communist areas and, significantly, into the Communist army if they so desire.

It is well known that the warfare in Korea is being prolonged by the Communists, who have repeatedly rejected the principle of nonforcible repatriation of prisoners of war. The world cannot forget the vicious and illogical Communist attack on the recent U.N. resolution which embodied this principle and which represented an earnest effort by 54 nations to bring about an armistice on just and reasonable terms.¹

Dr. Conant Takes Oath of Office

Statement by James B. Conant²

Press release 73 dated February 7

I have just taken the oath of office as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. I had a conference with President Eisenhower yesterday. I have been asked to proceed to Bonn as soon as possible. Therefore, I plan to fly to Frankfurt via London Monday afternoon. The news from Europe of the

¹ For excerpts from the Chinese Communists' reply to U.N. proposals on prisoners of war, see BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 75.

² Made on Feb. 7 on taking the oath of office as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 221.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 3, 1952, p. 326.

last few weeks makes evident the urgency of my mission.

I enter upon my new duties with a sense of humility and a feeling of the heavy responsibilities that rest upon one who represents the President of the United States in Germany in this crucial period of history. The tasks awaiting me in Germany have world-wide implications. The security of all free nations is closely linked to the continued development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which in turn requires the formation of a European defense force as provided in the EDC [European Defense Community] treaties. There must be a continual progress in bringing to fruition the plans already laid, and I trust that progress will be made in the coming months.

Within the near future, the German people and their representatives will be called upon to make a number of significant decisions—decisions which will affect their future political status and their membership in the council of free nations. The outcome of these decisions will also have direct bearing on the nature of the relationship between the United States and Germany. It is not for me to suggest, or to predict, the course of action which Germany will decide to take. But I am anxious to be in Germany to represent the U.S. Government during the coming critical weeks. I shall meet with leaders of the major political parties and offer such assistance to the Federal Government as may be desired by the Chancellor and his associates, and as is warranted by the general purposes of my mission.

My predecessors as U.S. High Commissioners for Germany have laid the sure foundations on which we must build as rapidly as we can. They established the basis for that happy relation which now exists between the peoples of the free, democratic Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. It is my hope that my efforts may be of some avail in strengthening still further the cultural and political ties between the two nations.

German Public Service Employee Claims

Press release 64 dated February 3

As a matter of particular interest to residents of the United States, who were formerly in the German public service, the Department of State invites attention to a "Law Concerning the Redress of National Socialist Wrongs to Former Employees of the Public Service Residing Abroad" which has been enacted by the Bundestag (lower house of the German Parliament).

The significance of this law is that it gives legal recognition to claims for pensions payments by former employees of the German public service now residing outside Germany and establishes the machinery and conditions under which such claims may be entered and satisfied. In brief, it provides

that former employees of the German public service with legal or permanent residence abroad, predating May 23, 1949, may file their claims for pensions through the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the country of residence. Claimants in the United States may submit their applications for redress to the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1742 R Street, NW., Washington, D. C., prior to March 31, 1953. In view of the imminent deadline, claimants are urged to communicate with the Diplomatic Mission without delay.

The law only makes provision for payment of benefits into blocked accounts in the Federal Republic. The transfer of such benefits abroad is subject to existing foreign exchange control regulations. However, an administrative regulation issued recently by the Federal Ministry of Economics establishes regulations for the transfer of such benefits out of Germany. The Department suggests that claimants to such pensions payments inquire of the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany the possibility of transferring their funds to the United States and the procedure to be followed in effecting such transfers.

New Investment Program For West Berlin

The following announcement was issued jointly at Berlin, on January 19, by the Mutual Security Agency, Office of the Special Mission to Western Germany, and the Federal Ministry for the Marshall Plan:

West Berlin will receive DM 200,000,000 in investment funds under a new long-range program aimed, among other things, at creating additional permanent jobs.

The money will come from counterpart funds derived from U.S. dollar aid by agreement between the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) Special Mission to Western Germany and the Government of the Federal Republic. At the same time, the procedure for approving Berlin investment projects has been simplified so that the new funds will find their way into the economy rapidly.

The new program brings to DM 874,000,000 the total amount of investment funds made available to Berlin out of counterpart derived from U.S. aid.

The new program is part of a Berlin long-term investment program, and sectors and projects are to be allocated funds in accordance with the extent to which they can be expected to provide additional permanent working places in Berlin, and the extent to which they will help Berlin to overcome its adverse payments position and its requirements for external assistance.

Loans will not be limited to enterprises already in existence but may be used to assist in the establishment of new firms.

Furthermore, insofar as possible, funds are to be allocated in such a manner as to further the objectives of the Benton amendment.¹ Thus, consideration will be given to the encouragement of free private enterprise, competition, and productivity.

Under the simplified procedure for acting promptly on investment projects, a new committee operating in Berlin will have full power to approve applications on behalf of the Berlin Senat, the Federal Republic, and the MSA Mission. The establishment of this committee, which will meet in Berlin every 2 weeks, eliminates the old procedure. The Berlin Industriebank will be represented on the committee ex-officio.

Applications for loans under the new program should be submitted in accordance with the directions issued by the Berlin Senat.

In determining the extent to which a project will help overcome Berlin's unfavorable trade balance, consideration will be given to the degree to which an enterprise will supply items exportable to the Federal Republic, or foreign countries at competitive prices, and the degree to which it will supply items for Berlin consumption which are now being imported.

Supplemental Agreement on German Industrial Controls

The following was released to the press at Bonn on January 12 by the Allied High Commission for Germany:

The High Commissioners of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France, on behalf of their respective Governments, have concluded an agreement on limitations on industry which supplements the Agreement on Industrial Controls concluded by them on April 3, 1951.²

The 1951 agreement continued certain of the prohibitions and limitations on industry. After the restrictions on steel-production capacity and steel production were lifted on July 25, 1952, the remaining limitations related solely to the production capacity of the shipbuilding, synthetic rubber, synthetic oil, and precision ball-and-roller bearings industries.

Under the new agreement, which does not affect existing controls related to items of a military nature, these few limitations will remain in effect, but only until the Parliaments of the Republic of France and the Federal Republic of Germany have finally voted on the laws for the approval of the Bonn conventions and of the European Defense Community.

¹ See Public Law 400, 82d Cong., ch. 449, 2d sess., H. R. 7005.

² For texts of the agreement of Apr. 3, and of a letter from the Allied High Commission to Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany summarizing provisions of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, pp. 621-623.

During the remaining period of validity of these limitations, the High Commissioners will take account of the increased needs of industry in the Federal Republic when considering applications for exemptions.

The text of the new "Agreement Supplemental to the Agreement on Industrial Controls" is attached.

Agreement Supplemental to the Agreement on Industrial Controls

The High Commissioners of France and of the United Kingdom and the Acting High Commissioner of the United States of America, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, hereby conclude on behalf of those Governments the following Agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article I of the Agreement concerning Industrial Controls signed at Bonn-Petersberg on the 3rd April, 1951.

Article 1

Except as may subsequently be agreed among the Governments parties to the present Agreement, the limitations laid down in the Agreement concerning Industrial Controls signed on the 3rd April, 1951, (as amended by the Agreement signed on the 25th July, 1952) shall continue in force after the 31st December, 1952, and until 21 days after the later of the following two dates, whereupon they shall cease to have effect:

- (a) the date on which the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany shall finally vote on the Laws for the approval of the Conventions signed at Bonn on the 26th May, 1952, and of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community signed at Paris on the 27th May, 1952;
- (b) the date on which the Parliament of the French Republic shall finally vote on the Laws for the approval of the said Conventions and of the said Treaty.

Article 2

This Agreement shall enter into effect on the 1st January, 1953.

DONE at Bonn-Mehlem on this thirty-first day of December, 1952, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government
of the French
Republic

ANDRÉ
FRANÇOIS-PONCET

For the Government
of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

IVONE KIRKPATRICK

For the Govern-
ment of the United
States of America

SAMUEL REBER

Completion of Credit to Austria for U.S. Cotton

Arrangements have now been completed for the operation of a credit of 6 million dollars for the purchase and export of cotton to Austria recently authorized by the Export-Import Bank,¹ it was announced on February 9.

The credit bearing interest at 2¾ percent per annum and repayable in 18 months is extended to the Republic of Austria, which has authorized the Creditanstalt-Bankverein and the Oesterreichische Laenderbank A. G. to operate this line of credit. These Banks will in turn utilize the

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 900.

services of 14 U.S. commercial banks which they have designated for this purpose.

The credit is to be used to finance the purchase of raw cotton, including spinnable waste, which has been purchased under contract entered into subsequent to November 28, 1952, and shipped subsequent to the date of the contract. The purchases and shipments are to be made in the customary manner with the order being placed directly by the textile mills in Austria or their agents with U.S. shippers. Financing of purchases will be effected through letters of credit under which 18-month drafts will be drawn on the Austrian Commercial Bank at whose request the letters of credit were issued and shall not exceed the C.I.F. cost of the cotton foreign-ocean port, plus insurance to destination in Austria. The letters of credit issued for this purpose are to expire not later than June 30, 1953.

U. S., U. K. To Exchange Views on Economic Matters

Press release 67 dated February 5

The following announcement was made in London and Washington simultaneously on February 5:

During his visit to London the Secretary of State extended on behalf of himself and the Secretary of the Treasury a cordial invitation to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to visit Washington for an informal and exploratory exchange of views with members of the new administration on the matters discussed at the recent Commonwealth Economic Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Butler will accordingly visit Washington for a few days at the beginning of March for the purpose of this exchange of views. There is no intention at this stage to negotiate any agreement with the U.S. Government.

Mr. Eden will combine this visit with the visit he will be making to the forthcoming Assembly of the United Nations.

Sterling Available to Commonwealth Countries

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on February 6 made the following announcement:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom (R. A. Butler) has informed the House of Commons that the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to make a substantial amount of sterling available for lending by the Bank on suitable projects in the Commonwealth countries

of the sterling area. The Chancellor stated that it was the intention that the sterling should come from the U.K. subscription to the capital stock of the Bank.

Eugene R. Black, president of the Bank, stated that the arrangements which had been discussed between the United Kingdom and the Bank envisaged funds of the order of £60,000,000 (equivalent to \$168 million) as suitable projects were forthcoming. Such funds would be disbursed by the Bank over a period of at least 6 years. "Actual disbursement of loan funds," explained Mr. Black, "takes place as the execution of the project progresses, and normally a loan is not fully disbursed until several years after the actual loan commitment is made."

Mr. Black added:

These arrangements are a demonstration of the part that can be played by nondollar capital in world economic development. The availability of nondollar capital to the Bank can enlarge the Bank's lending operations, especially in countries whose foreign exchange earnings and capacity to repay external debt are mainly in currencies other than dollars.

The Bank obtains its lendable funds from two main sources: from the capital subscriptions of its member governments, and from the sale of Bank securities in the capital markets of the world. The consent of a member government is, however, necessary before the Bank can use that part of a member's capital subscription paid up in domestic currency, or before the Bank can raise funds by a sale of its own securities in a member's capital market.

Previously, the United Kingdom has released to the Bank approximately £4.1 million from its sterling subscription of about £83.6 million. In addition, with the consent of the U.K. Treasury, the Bank raised sterling from the sale of £5 million of its securities in the London market in May 1951.

Agreement With British Guiana on Atkinson Field

After a series of consultations at Georgetown, British Guiana, representatives of the U.S. and British Guiana Governments on December 12, 1952, signed a Memorandum of Agreement settling outstanding matters arising from agreements concluded in 1949 on the use and disposition by British Guiana of certain buildings and installations at the Atkinson Field leased area. The memorandum also dealt with the provision of signal and radio navigation services to American military aircraft using the field. William P. Maddox, American Consul General at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B. W. I., signed the memorandum for the United States.

Following is a summary of the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement:

1. The British Guiana Government, disclaiming any

further need from a civil aviation standpoint for certain items of real and personal property loaned for use under the Interim Transfer Document of August 1, 1949, was relieved of responsibility for maintenance thereof. Since the items in question, with two exceptions, were not deemed potentially useful to the United States, nor of sufficient scrap value to warrant salvage operations, they were declared abandoned, under authority inherent in the Secretary of the Air Force, and turned over for the disposition of the British Guiana authorities. The two exceptions were the control tower and a generator set, both of which will be retained for such disposition as the Air Force may choose to make.

2. All other items of real and personal property, held by the British Guiana Government under the Interim Transfer Documents, are to be incorporated in the Schedules to the proposed Civil Aviation Agreement on the understanding that the maintenance obligation with respect thereto shall be modified as indicated in the present Agreement.

3. It was agreed that, with respect to the Contract of Sale of August 24, 1949, there should be an interchange of certain items of property between Schedule A (purchased by British Guiana for use in place) and Schedule B (purchased for salvage). These items are listed, respectively, in Schedules II and III of the present Memorandum of Agreement. Special conditions were attached to the disposition of the Station Dispensary, now transferred from Schedule A to B.

4. Signal and radionavigational services at Atkinson Field shall be provided to American military aircraft free of charge, so long as the traffic continues to be of an occasional nature. If the traffic increases substantially, a further agreement between the two Governments shall be concluded.

Mission To Survey British Guiana's Economy

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on January 30 that a general economic survey mission would leave on January 31 for British Guiana. It will undertake a study of the territory's economic potentialities, and will make recommendations designed to help the Government formulate and carry out a long-term development program. The mission was organized by the Bank at the request of the Governor of British Guiana. It will arrive in Georgetown on February 1 and is expected to stay in British Guiana about 6 weeks.

Three of the mission members are American, two are British, two are Dutch, and one is French. E. Harrison Clark, of the Bank's Department of Operations for the Western Hemisphere, will be the mission chief.

The mission also includes two other members of the Bank's staff, Cyril H. Davies (U.K.), assistant to the mission chief, and Kenneth A. Bohr (U.S.), an economist; W. F. Eysvoegel (Netherlands), an expert on water resources; E. R. Hondeink (U.K.), a transportation expert; and three agricultural specialists—Maurice Guillaume (France), an expert on agricultural production; Johannes H. L. Joosten (Netherlands), an agricultural economist; and Eugene C. Reichard (U.S.), an expert on forest products. The Food

and Agriculture Organization nominated the agricultural specialists and is sharing the cost of their services.

Semiannual Report of International Bank

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported a net income of \$7,639,743 for the 6-month period ended December 31, 1952, compared with \$8,071,486 for a similar period in 1951.¹ Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$20,696,715 compared with \$16,637,921 in 1951.

The net income was placed in the Supplemental Reserve Against Losses on Loans and Guarantees, increasing this reserve to \$65,667,843. Loan commissions, which amounted to \$4,536,682, were credited to the Bank's special reserve, as required by the articles of agreement, increasing this reserve to \$32,221,336. Total reserves on December 31, 1952, were \$97,889,179.

During the second quarter of the fiscal year, the 3 months ended December 31, 1952, the Bank floated two bond issues: 60 million dollar 19-year 3½ percent bonds due October 15, 1971, and Swiss franc 50,000,000 3½ percent 10-year bonds due December 1, 1962. Expenses for the 3-month period, totaling \$7,885,582, included bond issuance and other financial expenses of \$2,331,480 in connection with the two issues. In the comparable period of 1951 such charges were nominal.

During the 6-month period ended December 31, the Bank made six loans totaling \$112,133,464 in Australia, Colombia, Finland, Iceland, India, and Peru. These loans increased total loans signed by the Bank to \$1,524,266,464. Disbursements on loans were \$120,004,529, bringing total disbursements to \$996,508,662 on December 31, 1952.

Repayments of principal were received from borrowers as due; they totaled \$514,432. During the 6-month period, the Bank also sold to private investors \$9,293,220 of securities from its loan portfolio: \$4,978,400 with its guarantee and \$4,314,820 without. These transactions brought total portfolio sales to \$65,669,908: \$46,477,401 with the Bank's guarantee, and \$19,192,507 without.

France gave the Bank permission to use French francs equivalent to \$180,000 from its paid-in franc subscription to the Bank's capital for any loan the Bank has made to Iceland. Italy gave similar permission for the use of its lire subscription in an amount equivalent to \$519,000 for any loans made to Turkey. Sweden approved the use of 18,000,000 Swedish kronor (\$3,479,464) from its paid-in subscription for the supplemental loan to Finland for the wood-products industries, signed in November 1952.

¹ For memorandum relating to the financial statements, see International Bank release of Feb. 6.

755 More Tube Wells To Be Drilled in India

Press release 70 dated February 6

The Department of State announced on February 6 that contracts have just been signed in New Delhi and Lucknow, with Harold T. Smith, Inc., of Washington, D.C., for drilling 300 tube wells in the State of Pepsu, 255 in Punjab and 200 in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The contracts are between the states and the Smith Company.

The wells involved in these contracts are part of the 2,000 provided for under the Indo-American Point Four Program. A contract for 500 tubewells, as they are called in India, was made in November 1952 with the German Water Development Corporation. All these are to be drilled in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The other 745 wells will be drilled by other agencies of the state government or by private companies under contracts with the states.

The Point Four tube-well program, for which \$13,700,000 of American funds and Rs. 44,450,000 (about \$9,300,000) have been set aside, is designed to achieve an immediate increase in India's food production and help to overcome the food deficit of the nation.

The three states of Northern India—Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Pepsu—already have thousands of tube wells in operation, a type of development that has been going on for years, particularly since the early 1930's.

A tube well is what is known in this country as the "bored well," used in irrigation throughout the southwestern United States. The rich agricultural area of Madera County, Calif., alone has more than 2,000 now in use.

The Gangetic Plain of northern India is an especially favorable location, since it has a 12-month growing season and since the water table is replenished from snows on the Himalaya mountains, highest mountain range in the world. The Indian climate permits two crops a year, but parts of the area, depending only on rainfall, can raise only one crop at the time of the summer monsoon. Canal water from rivers also is used for irrigation in the dry season from September to June but even this tapers off during the dry season. Tube wells, therefore, serve a supplementary role in this case.

Crops in the area are chiefly wheat, millet, sugar cane, and rice.

Each individual tube well is capable of delivering 750 gallons of water per minute and will irrigate from 300 to 400 acres of land. Depth ranges from 200 to 400 feet and due to the good water table, there is a low pump lift. Electric

motors and some individual Diesel units will be used to pump water.

Under the Indo-American agreement, the wells become the property of the states, which will operate and maintain them and collect water charges. Construction costs of the wells are treated as a loan to the states and return payments will go into a special fund for further development purposes.

The 2000-well program is one of the 11 projects agreed on by India and the United States under the 1951-52 Point Four Program. Additional wells are planned in another project agreement under the 1952-53 program and a separate project is planned for exploratory wells in untested areas, where good possibilities are known to exist and where irrigation should be greatly aided.

Rubber Working Party Prepares Draft Agreement

Press release 48 dated January 28

At its meeting in Ottawa May 5-9, 1952, the International Rubber Study Group established a Working Party¹ whose terms of reference were:

To consider whether measures designed to prevent burdensome surpluses or serious shortages of rubber are necessary and practicable; to prepare drafts of any agreements required to implement such measures; and to report back to the Study Group as soon as possible.

The Working Party has concluded its second session in London, at which it continued the work, begun at its first session held last summer, July 30-August 15, 1952, in London, of examining the various types of international arrangements which, within its terms of reference, might be applicable to natural rubber. It decided to concentrate on the buffer stock type of agreement, and has prepared a draft of such an agreement for the consideration of the International Rubber Study Group at its meeting in May 1953 in Copenhagen.

The delegates to the Working Party, representing both consuming and producing countries, were of the opinion that, subject to final agreement on a number of points, a buffer stock agreement on the lines of the draft would be practicable.

The Working Party considered that the question of necessity for such an agreement could best be discussed at the next meeting of the International Rubber Study Group.

The preparation of the draft does not in any way imply acceptance in principle, or otherwise, by any member government.

¹ BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 913.

The United States, the United Nations, and Africa

by *Vernon McKay*¹

The choice of Africa as a subject for this session of the Cleveland Institute is a source of real satisfaction to those of us in the Department of State who work on African problems. As public servants we are anxious to learn what the public is thinking about Africa, and we are confident that meetings such as this will lead to the development of a broader public interest and knowledge. The United States also needs a larger number of trained experts who specialize on African affairs. American universities have many area-studies programs on Europe, Latin America, the Far East, and the Near East, but African studies are only just beginning, and we have no journals, either academic or popular, devoted to this rapidly emerging continent. Your participation in this Institute shows that public awareness of these needs is growing, and leads us to hope that they will soon be filled.

Those of you who have made even a cursory study of Africa realize its enormity and diversity, and you therefore appreciate the fact that it is dangerously misleading to generalize about a continent so complex and varied. This is a point which also constantly impresses us in the Department of State. We operate on the basis of certain general principles and objectives which are difficult enough to formulate, but our task becomes immeasurably more complicated when we try to apply these general principles to specific problems. You can readily understand the difficulties in formulating a U.S. policy for Africa if you stop to think for a moment. North of the Sahara is a Mediterranean world where nearly two million Europeans live alongside Hamitic and Semitic peoples, the Berbers and the Arabs, who outnumber them ten to one, and I do not include the population of Egypt in this total. At the southern end of the continent in the Union of South Africa

live another two and a half million Europeans and a third of a million Asians, who are outnumbered about four to one by Negro peoples. A significant fact about this area was once called to my attention by a South African who pointed out to me that his ancestors went from Europe to his home in the Union several generations before my ancestors came to the United States.

A third great area of Africa is the East-Central belt lying between the Sahara and the Union; here Europeans and Asians in much smaller numbers are trying to make their homes in territories where the ratio of African to European varies from well over 1,000 to 1 in Uganda, to perhaps 175 to 1 in Kenya, and only 14 or 15 to 1 in Southern Rhodesia. Finally, on the western side of the continent is an overwhelmingly African world where Europeans and Asians are for the most part a tiny minority of officials, traders, and missionaries.

These four Africas together cover an area nearly four times as large as the United States and have different climates and topographies as well as different racial and cultural patterns. As a matter of fact, the variety within each of these four areas is so great that it is not even practicable to have a single policy for each of them. In any case, whether one policy or many policies are needed, I have said enough to emphasize Africa's complexity.

Despite this great variety, however, the different parts of Africa do have certain similarities, and the Department of State has been able to work out certain general principles or objectives which guide our handling of African problems. It will help you to understand these objectives if I first explain the factors and interests which we took into account in formulating them.

Let me begin with what is possibly the longest standing of these factors, namely, the traditional humanitarianism of the American people—an interest which takes many forms. One powerful factor in our ideals has always been our traditional sympathy toward the aspirations of all peoples to

¹ Address made before the 27th Annual Institute of the Council on World Affairs at Cleveland on Jan. 31. Mr. McKay is the acting officer in charge of Trusteeship Affairs, Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

determine their own destinies. Another is the idealism of the members of our churches, whose humanitarian motives are fortified by deep religious convictions, and who are now supporting more than five thousand American missionaries throughout the continent. These missionaries not only bring the Christian religion to Africa but are doing outstanding medical and educational work. Many of our great churches are at this moment engaged in a national study program to educate their membership on Africa's problems and needs.

Still another factor is the generosity with which Americans have responded to appeals for assistance in raising African health and educational standards. A striking example of the contribution made by our great philanthropic organizations is the participation of the Rockefeller Foundation in the fight against yellow fever in Africa. Our Negro leaders and organizations are another group who are playing an increasingly significant part in these efforts. These many humanitarian interests, combined with our faith in the application of technology as a means of promoting progress, have been in part responsible for our inauguration of the Point Four Program, which has raised to the level of a national policy the traditional efforts of the American people to share their benefits and skills with less fortunate peoples. This is the kind of "enlightened self-interest" which Mr. Dulles described as the guide to our foreign policy in his first major statement as Secretary of State a few days ago.²

A second major interest of the United States is what I shall call, for want of a better term, a political interest. We do not have and do not want any territory in Africa, but we do have a vital concern in its political future. It is imperative that we do all we can to help insure that the continent does not fall under Soviet domination or influence. As Secretary Dulles pointed out Tuesday night, the Communists are trying to arouse Africans to revolt.

Forestalling Communist Penetration

The direct responsibility for Africa belongs to other governments, but our position among the leading nations of the world makes it impossible for us to neglect an area of such importance. It is our hope that Africa's emerging peoples will choose of their own free will to remain associated with the democratic nations of the free world. Thus far the best information available indicates that the inroads communism has made in Africa are not of major proportions. We feel it imperative, therefore, to forestall further Communist penetration by doing what we can to help in the development of healthy political, economic, social, and educational institutions in Africa.

² For text of Secretary Dulles' address of Jan. 27, see BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 212.

Of the two most popular theories on how to check communism, one maintains that Africans will turn to the Soviet Union for aid unless they are given self-government *quickly*, while the other contends that Africans will fall easy prey to Soviet domination if they are given self-government *too quickly*. Possibly there is an element of truth in both views. The disagreement centers around the word *quickly*, that is, on the element of timing. Most people have now accepted the idea that the goal for all the peoples of Africa should be self-government in one form or another. What we need today is steady progress toward that goal.

I do not need to say much about our strategic interest in Africa because it was revealed to all the world by our experience in World War II when we not only had to undertake military campaigns in North Africa but also had to develop a vitally important supply line across West, Central, and East Africa. This strategic interest, of course, also encompasses Africa's supply of strategic materials. If we are to play our necessary role in safeguarding the freedom of the democratic nations of the world, it is vital for us to stockpile and to have access to African sources of such critical materials as uranium, manganese, bauxite, copper, chrome, tin, columbite, and industrial diamonds, to mention only a few of the 95 now listed by our Munitions Board.

U.S. Economic Stake

Finally, what is our economic stake in Africa? Our trade with Africa has always been relatively small, although it is an interesting fact that in the heyday of sailing vessels our Yankee clippers were carrying about a million dollars worth of Massachusetts sheeting to East Africa every year. As late as the 1850's about half the vessels calling at Zanzibar were American, chiefly from Salem. The word "Amerikani" or "Merikani" became a Swahili word for calico, and one of the clipper captains relates—how accurately I do not know—that the trademark "Massachusetts sheeting" was especially prized in the interior of the continent and was always conspicuously displayed on cotton *dotis* or loincloths.

Today our trade with Africa is still less than 5 percent of our total world trade but is nonetheless important. Our exports to Africa totaled \$580,000,000 in 1951 and our imports from Africa \$589,000,000, with the Union of South Africa accounting for more than half the total. Practically all of our industrial diamonds, vital for our machine-tool industry, come from Africa, and I have already called your attention to our needs for many other African minerals.

You would also find some surprising changes in your everyday life if we were suddenly cut off from Africa's vegetable products. The loss of our palm-oil supplies, 90 percent or more of which come from Africa, would make soap scarce and

would handicap our steel and tin-plating industry. Without African sisal, our cordage and twine supplies would be reduced by at least 25 percent. Our great chocolate manufacturers who import thousands of tons of cocoa beans from West Africa every year would have to cut your chocolate candy in half. Spices and wool would be greatly reduced, and even your shoes and leather goods would be affected, for we buy over 90 percent of our wattle bark and extract for tanning purposes from Africa, as well as a considerable proportion of our hides and skins.

To conclude this brief description of our economic stake, it should be noted that our businessmen have direct investments of nearly 300 million dollars in Africa, almost half of which is in the Union of South Africa in such enterprises as automobile assembly plants, tire factories, and the mining industry. In relation to our total overseas direct investments of nearly 12 billion dollars, this is a small figure. Opportunities in other areas have heretofore been more attractive to our investors.

Our Major Objectives

From this survey of the factors and interests which affect our policy toward Africa, it is clear that our interests, like Africa itself, are quite varied and full of dilemmas. Some of our critics contend that we use these dilemmas as an excuse for inaction. One of them has recently written: "While our policy-makers still talk about not crossing bridges until we get to them, we are actually crossing bridges without knowing it." The question raised by this criticism is an important one, but I can assure you that the Department of State is fully aware of its importance. In order to insure that our policy is planned in advance and that we do not take a series of isolated steps which commit us to a policy without our realizing what has happened, we have developed departmental and interdepartmental machinery to bring our African specialists into constant communication in order to concentrate their combined knowledge and skills. Through this process we not only keep our African policy under continual review, but we have succeeded in hammering out certain guiding principles or objectives which are sufficiently precise yet sufficiently flexible to meet our needs. These objectives were stated by the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for African affairs [George C. McGhee] on May 8, 1950.^{2a}

First, it is one of our major objectives to see that the peoples of Africa, in their own interests, advance in the right direction and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. We favor the progressive development of the dependent peoples of Africa toward the goal of self-government or, where conditions are suit-

able, toward independence. The attainment of this objective, in which we can play only a cooperative role with the administering powers, imposes upon all concerned a heavy burden of self-discipline and the need to undertake voluntary long-term planning of the highest order.

A second major objective, which arises out of our relations both with the metropolitan powers and with the peoples of Africa, is our desire to assure the development of mutually advantageous economic relations between them, in the interests of contributing to restoration of a sound European economy and in the interests of furthering the aspirations of the African peoples. . . .

Third, the United States wishes to preserve its rights of equal economic treatment in the territories of Africa and to participate itself, both commercially and financially, in the development of this great continent along with other nations of the world. . . .

Finally, it is a major objective of United States policy to assist in providing an environment in which the African peoples will feel that their aspirations can best be served by continued association and cooperation with the nations of the free world, both in their present status and as they advance toward self-government or independence in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

It now remains for me to describe what we are doing to achieve these objectives. Through our diplomatic channels we try to carry on a full and frank exchange of views with other governments to assure ourselves that Africa is moving toward these goals. These diplomatic channels include our embassies in the capitals of the 6 European states which have territory in Africa, as well as 4 embassies, 2 legations, 12 consulates-general and 10 consulates in the Continent of Africa. In addition, and very important indeed, is our representation in many U.N. organs, commissions, and agencies where we join with other nations in a constructive interchange of views which focus world attention on Africa's needs. Because my own work in the Department of State is particularly concerned with African issues which arise in the United Nations, I am going to devote special attention to this part of our program.

Before turning to our U.N. activities, however, I wish to call your attention to the extent and character of two other programs through which we are trying to achieve our objectives. These are our program of economic aid and our information and educational exchange program.

Until 1948 our economic and financial assistance to Africa was small. Greater assistance was made possible by the inauguration of the European Recovery Program and the subsequent development of the Point Four Program.³ An agreement signed in Paris in 1947 provided that the Economic Cooperation Administration [ECA] would furnish material and financial assistance, both loans and grants, to those European countries devastated by war "together with dependent areas under their administration." ECA and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency [MSA], have undertaken many projects for technical assistance,

³ For additional information on assistance programs in Africa, see article by Harry N. Howard, *ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 936.

^{2a} *Ibid.*, June 19, 1950, p. 1002.

for economic development, and for the procurement of strategic materials and other defense supporting activities in Africa. Similar assistance is being provided on a smaller scale by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State which handles our Point Four technical assistance programs for the independent states of Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya; by the Defense Materials Procurement Agency; and by the Export-Import Bank. The United States has also supplied almost 40 percent of the funds which the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have allocated to Africa. According to the latest estimate prepared in the Department of State, the grand total of post-war economic aid to Africa by these four U.S. agencies and by the United Nations and the International Bank, through June 30, 1952, was \$635,986,000. Of this total, \$296,222,700 was in the form of loans, \$156,500,000 of which came from the International Bank. It should also be mentioned that France has allocated for its African territories the equivalent of \$202,486,000 of what are called counterpart funds in our Mutual Security Program; these are funds which France provides in its own currency to match dollar grants from the United States. You should not overlook the fact that the total amount of this American aid is relatively small in comparison with the several billion dollars the European powers are putting into African development programs of their own. MSA aid is designed to supplement these European efforts.

For what is this money being spent? In a booklet published by the Mutual Security Agency⁴ you will find two maps of Africa indicating the territories in which it operates and the projects it is undertaking. These include strategic-materials development, road and bridge construction, railway development, surveys of land and water resources and other much-needed projects which will stimulate economic development and raise African standards of living as well as contribute to the security of the United States, Africa, and Europe.

One of the most interesting examples of what can be done with a limited amount of economic assistance is the remarkable development of Liberia in the past 10 years. Until World War II the Liberian Government operated on a very small budget, most of which was derived from revenues from the rubber exports of the Firestone Company, which has a \$28,000,000 capital investment in the country. During the war an American air base was built at Roberts Field; a good harbor was begun at the capital city of Monrovia; and the United States sent economic and public-health missions to Liberia. The Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State has now taken over the economic and public-health missions.

⁴ *The Overseas Territories in the Mutual Security Program*, Mar. 31, 1952.

In 1950 the Government of Liberia, with the assistance of our Technical Cooperation Administration, produced a notable 5-year economic development program to cost more than \$32,000,000, most of which is to be paid for by the Liberians. The port of Monrovia was completed in 1948 and is now earning substantial profits, and U.S. nationals have invested another 15 million dollars in Liberia since the end of World War II. In 1950 our Export-Import Bank extended a credit of \$5,000,000 to Liberia for roads and \$1,300,000 for sanitary facilities in Monrovia. Four of the specialized agencies of the United Nations—UNESCO, ILO, FAO, and WHO—have also joined in this cooperative venture in technical assistance, the most important objectives of which are road construction, a national system of elementary education, a national system of agricultural research and extension, a national program of public health, and improvements in public administration.

Information Program Activities

A second important means of achieving our objectives is our Information and Educational Exchange Program. This campaign in the struggle for the minds of men is trying to fill an important need in Africa, where Europeans and Asians as well as Africans have mixed feelings toward us, at times friendly and sympathetic, at other times suspicious and critical. Europeans sometimes protest over what they regard as an American tendency to give indiscriminate support to nationalists who demand immediate independence without adequate preparation, and at other times they express the fear that our economic-aid programs conceal ulterior motives to supplant European business interests. Among the Africans there are many who are deeply interested in the United States and who much appreciate the sympathy which Americans have for African aspirations. At the same time racial discrimination in the United States is often publicized in Africa with unfortunate results. There is nothing more important to many Africans than this matter of race relations, and some of them have the false idea that the Russians do better than we do in this field.

Perhaps I can best emphasize the importance of this racial factor by briefly recounting two of many incidents which have given the United States adverse publicity in Africa. Please bear in mind that I mention them not to pass judgment on our own very complex racial problems, but only to emphasize the importance of their repercussions in Africa. One of these incidents was the conviction and execution of seven Negroes for rape of a white woman. West Africa's best known newspaper on February 20, 1951, made the following editorial comment on the "Martinsville Seven":

By killing these men for a crime in which no white person had ever been condemned, America has lowered

its prestige in the world more effectively than any Communist propaganda.

Perhaps even more remarkable in some ways is an episode which occurred in Paris in 1951 in the Assembly of the French Union. This parliamentary body—composed of 102 representatives of metropolitan France and 102 representatives of French territories overseas, mostly from Africa—is reported to have observed one minute of silence in memory of Willie McGee, another American Negro who was convicted and executed for rape of a white woman. Perhaps you will want to keep the African attitude on such incidents in mind this afternoon during your discussion of what the United States should do about its relations with Africa.

In any event it is clear that we need to give the peoples of Africa a balanced picture of American life. Our public affairs officers in Africa, some of whom are Negroes, are doing just that through press, radio, film, library, and public-speaking programs; and they include as an important part of their story the continuing forward steps made by Negro Americans. You will recall that President Eisenhower said in his inaugural address: ⁵

We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable.

We must make this point clear to the Africans.

To give Africa a true picture of America it is also valuable to bring students and leaders from Africa to see for themselves, and we do this on a very small scale through our educational exchange program. Most Africans here, however, do not receive U.S. Government aid. Some pay their own way, and others come with the help of scholarships from our universities or their own governments. You will be interested to know that more than 650 of them are today studying in American colleges and universities. Their importance is greater than their numbers, for they will be leaders in their countries when they return, a fact that is well illustrated by the outstanding example of the new Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah. The Department of State is anxious for these Africans to enjoy and profit from their stay in the United States, and you can help by doing all you can to make their visit a pleasant one.

Importance of United Nations

I now turn to my final subject, the wide-ranging program of activities affecting Africa which the United States carries on in the United Nations. For this important work we assumed certain direct obligations and responsibilities when the U.S. Senate approved the Charter of the United Nations, three chapters of which are devoted to the needs and aspirations of those African and other peoples throughout the world who do not yet govern themselves. Our vital concern over this prob-

lem was indicated by the Secretary of State last October at the seventh session of the General Assembly, when he devoted a major portion of his opening address to those issues arising out of the legitimate aspiration of dependent peoples for a determining voice in their own affairs.⁶

The attention which members of the United Nations have devoted to Africa has steadily grown. When the Charter was signed at San Francisco in 1945, many people thought that insofar as African issues were discussed in the United Nations they would be largely dealt with in the Trusteeship Council which supervises the administration of seven trust territories in Africa and four in the Pacific. Today, however, the proliferation of U.N. activities affecting Africa has extended throughout the organization. One step of major significance has been the creation of a committee of sixteen members which examines information transmitted on more than 60 non-self-governing or colonial territories which are not under international trusteeship, a committee which is not provided for in the Charter and which is regarded as extra-constitutional if not unconstitutional by the principal colonial powers.

The Economic and Social Council discusses many other African problems, including proposals for an Economic Commission for Africa and recommendations to promote the right of self-determination for dependent peoples. The Security Council has discussed the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The International Court of Justice has considered the South-West African question and the Moroccan claims issue. The African activities of the specialized agencies in the fields of agriculture, education, health, and labor are also mounting. Most important of all, as those of you know who followed its meetings last fall, the General Assembly made African problems one of its main concerns. Its discussions and resolutions have touched upon nearly all of the continent's main areas and problems—the disposition of the former Italian colonies, the Tunisian and Moroccan questions, the Ewe and Togoland unification movements in West Africa, the eviction of Wamru tribesmen from certain lands in Tanganyika in East Africa, the international status of South-West Africa, the problems of the Indians in South Africa and of racial conflict in South Africa, the general problem of African economic development, and many other questions.

On all of these complicated issues the representatives of the United States must vote and frequently must explain the position of their Government. Because our great power has thrust us into a position of world leadership, our vote on these questions is watched with unusual interest by the other 59 members of the United Nations, and by the many people throughout the world who take an interest in these issues. Our sense of responsibility is therefore very great.

⁵ BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 167.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 639.

Our task might not be so difficult if it were not for the fact that our friends who join us on such crucial U.N. issues as the Korean conflict are sharply divided in their views on many African questions. This cleavage was so sharp last month in New York that the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium informed the General Assembly that they would no longer participate in the Assembly's important Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories if the Assembly adopted a proposal to make this committee in effect a permanent organ—a step which in their view would be contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. The Assembly in plenary session averted this crisis by accepting a proposal originally made by the United States to review the committee for 3 years; the Assembly thus reversed a decision taken earlier by its fourth committee which would have renewed the committee indefinitely.

Conflicting Opinions

From conflicts such as these the United States has learned how very deeply our friends feel. On one side is the view of such members as the great new nations of India and Pakistan; in a notable statement at the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris on November 14, 1951, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan, describing "the fierce passion" with which subject peoples resent alien domination, termed the colonial question "the biggest political problem of the day." On the other side is the view expressed in the Assembly on October 21, 1952, by the Right Honorable Henry Hopkinson, British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, when he said, "My own feeling in this matter is one of intense pride in our achievements in what may be described as the colonial field over several hundreds of years." The emotion which underlies both these views is readily understandable. In the one instance it is the natural pride of new nations, recently emerged from colonial status and anxious to help others toward the same goal. In the other it is the natural pride of old nations, our European friends, who have made real contributions to their African territories, particularly since the end of World War II, by constitutional reform and by the outlay of several billion dollars for economic, social, and educational development.

With this knowledge of the emotional atmosphere in which certain African issues are sometimes discussed in the United Nations, you can better understand the general position which our representatives take on such issues. First of all, we firmly believe in the principles of the Charter and in the machinery which has been set up to implement them. We believe that this machinery cannot function as effectively as possible without the cooperation of all members, and, in particular, it seems to us self-evident that the recommendations of the United Nations cannot be implemented

without the cooperation of the colonial powers. Whether or not one agrees with him, Walter Lippmann, in his daily column on January 12, posed a problem which deserves thought. He wrote:

The U. N. is being torn apart by the formula that almost any one can put almost any claim before . . . [it], and then can compel all the nations to align themselves pro and con, black or white. This is a perfect formula for failing to make peace, for dividing mankind, and for fomenting bad will.

Mr. Lippmann has oversimplified the problem but he does have a point.

In any case we feel it essential for the United States to conduct itself with moderation, restraint, and a high sense of responsibility if the United Nations is to be effective in helping the peoples of Africa. Some of our critics have likened this policy to the act of a tightrope walker who spends all of his time doing nothing but keeping from falling off on one side or the other. We do not regard this as a fair criticism. We do not deny that we sometimes walk a tightrope, but we do so because we consider that statesmanship requires us to steer a steady course between the views of those impatient people who demand faster progress and those intransigent people who complain that every forward step is taken too soon and goes too far.

The Ewe Problem

To give you an example of how this policy works in practice, let me describe the position of the United States on an important question which has been before the United Nations for nearly 6 years. This is a problem raised in many petitions by the Ewe people who live in British and French West Africa. More than 800,000 of these alert and able Africans live in the two neighboring trust territories of British and French Togoland, and in the British colony of the Gold Coast. A majority of them desire to be placed under one administration in order to put an end to the political, economic, financial and cultural barriers which keep them apart. We have urged that they be given the fullest possible hearing. They have sent numerous petitioners to United Nations meetings in New York, Paris, and Geneva to present their claims in person, and the Trusteeship Council has asked two of its Visiting Missions to West Africa to go into the Ewe area and make special studies of the problem.

Out of this thorough investigation, one of the most important facts that has come to light is that other peoples in the two trust territories outnumber the Ewe people and disagree with them as to the political future. In this situation the Department of State has felt that the most constructive contribution it could make was to take the lead in proposing U.N. recommendations asking the British and French to take steps to minimize the economic, fiscal, and cultural barriers which restrict Ewe movements across the frontiers, and

to establish elected organs to bring together the peoples concerned for regular consultation and mutual exchange of views. Because of the division of opinion among the Africans themselves on the political problem, as well as the fact that their opinions seem to be in a stage of evolution, we have felt it would be unwise for the United Nations to make any definite recommendations asking the British and French to modify the international frontiers.

This case study illustrates our difficulty in developing a policy which will be reasonable and at the same time widely acceptable. Although the British and French have responded to United Nations recommendations by minimizing the frontier barriers, the Ewe people are not satisfied because they still want political unification. Moreover, our position has not pleased many of our friends in the United Nations because we have been unable to support either certain proposals of the British and French or certain proposals of noncolonial powers who have advocated the immediate unification of the two Togolands.

Our search for a solution of the Ewe problem is a part of our continual inquiry into the larger question of the future of Africa. In this age of clash between the ideals of political independence and economic interdependence, it seems essential to develop ways and means of enabling Africans to achieve their aspirations for self-government without losing the economic support which makes the full enjoyment of freedom possible. The late Dr. James Aggrey, a distinguished Gold Coast African, once said:

In the harmony of the world, as in the harmony of an organ or a piano, the black and white keys are both essential.

Whether such harmony can be achieved in Africa no one can be certain, but we in the Department of State hope that Africans, Europeans, Asians, and Americans will continue their best efforts both inside and outside the United Nations to look for new approaches to the problem.

The postwar evolution of the British Commonwealth of Nations from a white commonwealth into a multiracial commonwealth with three new Asian members, Ceylon, Pakistan and India, is one of the most promising developments in many years. It now looks as if a fully self-governing Gold Coast will soon be entering this multiracial family of nations. Another new concept, closer to home, is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico established on July 25, 1952, by a constitution drawn up and overwhelmingly approved by the Puerto Ricans themselves. Although control over

such matters as Puerto Rico's defense and foreign relations has been left to the United States, the final declaration adopted by the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico terms the new constitution a "compact entered into by mutual consent," and concludes:

Thus we attain the goal of complete self-government, the last vestiges of colonialism having disappeared in the principle of Compact, and we enter into an era of new developments in democratic civilization.

These bold new concepts are promising examples and challenging opportunities for the future of Africa and the free world. If such patterns of cooperation and good will prevail, the emerging nationalisms of the peoples of Africa not only will profit from their contacts with other civilizations but will make a great contribution to the future of all men everywhere.

The Communist War in POW Camps

The following summary of an intelligence study entitled "The Communist War in POW Camps" was released to the press at Tokyo by the United Nations Command (UNC) on January 28:

Direct responsibility for conduct of the Communist campaign on the second front of the Korean war—the UNC prisoner-of-war camps—is charged to Communist Generals Nam Il and Lee Sang Jo in an intelligence study released today by Headquarters, U.N. Command. According to the study, the mutinies by the Communist prisoners at Koje Do and Cheju-Do were deliberately planned and masterminded by the Communist delegates at Panmunjom.

The study, which appraises the organization of Communist control and the planning and conduct of incidents in UNC-controlled prison camps, is based on hitherto secret military reports which reveal beyond a doubt that the Communist delegates at Panmunjom have dual functions. The study states that ostensibly the two Communist generals are present to represent the Communists in the armistice negotiations. Covertly, and more important, they are assigned to mastermind the incidents within UNC prisoner-of-war camps.

General Nam Il, in his capacity as Cultural Chief of Staff of the Security Agency for the North Korean Army, is responsible for insuring the loyalty of the army to the state by controlling all personnel through political officers or commissars. Nam Il is a former Soviet officer and a U.S.S.R. citizen of Korean extraction. General Lee Sang Jo, Nam Il's deputy at Panmunjom, is chief of the Collection of Military Intelligence Section for the North Korean Army.

These two generals and their fanatical followers have exploited a new area of total war, the study

The United States in the United Nations

A regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

shows. No Communist soldier, even though a prisoner of the other side, may be permitted to withdraw his support of communism. The Communists consider all prisoners held in Unc camps to be soldiers still under their control but physically detained temporarily by the Unc.

The Communist concept of prisoners of war as "fighters" continuing the war within Unc camps is well illustrated by a hand-written Communist summary of the results of the attempted mass breakout at Pongam-Do on December 14, 1952, in the course of which 85 prisoners lost their lives and 113 were wounded. The summary recognized that heavy casualties had been expected but that "our fighting comrades . . . were determined to die a glorious death." Although the "task imposed on us by the party and the fatherland"—which was to break out—could not be fulfilled, the "main purpose" was to "develop a class fight to give the enemy a crushing defeat." The party leadership was satisfied that this had been done, summarizing that in the "magnificent effort" the prisoners "lost nothing but their lives in the fight, and these were for liberation and glorious victory." The document labeled the uprising as a "lethal fight . . . connected with the fatherland war," claiming "a great victory" because the U.N. Command "had no other alternative but to broadcast the Pongam-Do incident of December 14, 1952, by radio, without concealment, to the whole world," and "the press of the whole world devoted its attention to Compound F and the investigation of the incident."

The Geneva Convention pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war defines certain privileges and responsibilities for both the prisoner and the detaining power. The U.N. Command's respect for this convention is not matched by the Communists whose prisoners in Unc camps and whose delegates at Panmunjom demand the privileges but shun the responsibilities. To them the Convention is applicable only when it is to their advantage to quote it.

In 1951, the study points out, the Communists began to plan action in support of this concept. Adhering to their axiom that the end justifies the means, the Communists in mid-1951 plotted to control and utilize their soldiers held prisoner by the Unc—regardless of the outcome for the participants and in complete disregard of the Geneva Convention. Their methodical and thorough planning was two-fold: (1) mass mutinies, riots, and breakouts which had as their goal an eventual link-up with the Communist guerrillas and bandits in South Korea, and (2) direct violence designed to produce propaganda which might influence the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

Once the plan was ready the Communists turned to reorganization. During the latter half of 1951 item 4 of the armistice conference agenda brought to the forefront the problem of prisoner-of-war repatriation. To meet the problems which they

expected to arise from this item the Communists organized a special unit to train prison camp agents and furnish intelligence to the Communists at Panmunjom. The unit was attached to the headquarters of the North Korean Army and was under the supervision of General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate at Panmunjom.

In order to establish contact with prisoners in the Unc camps and to insure coordination, the Communist high command utilized the guerrilla guidance bureau which is responsible for infiltration of agents into South Korea and control of guerrilla operations. This activity is under General Pae Chol, who also is a Soviet Army officer.

Major General Lee Sang Jo, Chief of the Collection of Military Intelligence Section of the North Korean Army, was appointed deputy to Nam Il. In this capacity he could furnish timely and accurate intelligence to the Communist delegates. Nam Il's liaison officer between Panmunjom and his command at the North Korean Army Headquarters is General Kim Pa, a former Soviet Mvd agent who holds a high position in the North Korean political security department. He was reported on various occasions to be present at the armistice negotiations disguised variously as a sergeant or lieutenant.

Many prisoners captured by the U.N. Forces have admitted they were deliberate plants, dispatched to penetrate the prison camps at Koje Do where they were to establish "cell organization committees" in each camp. The cells were to carry out strikes, protests and demonstrations.

The first step in the formation of a Communist apparatus is establishment of the Communist party structure. According to the study, in May of 1951 the Koje-Do branch of the Korean Labor Party (KLP-BASH Communist Party), known as the Liberation Fighting Association, was organized in compound 92. Similar organizations with subordinate political, agitation and youth association (military) sections, were formed in most of the other compounds. Among the objectives adopted by the KLP organization in the PW camps was the following: "We must consider the possible rupture of the cease-fire talks which are now under way and be ready to liberate ourselves in accordance with orders from Kim Il Sung. All types of units must be organized to rise in revolt, simultaneously, in order to liberate all the prisoners of war and attack the Republic of Korea and American Forces that now occupy Koje-Do."

Later, compound leaders advised prisoners of war not to submit to screening. They instructed their followers that the armistice negotiations were nearly completed and that all prisoners of war would be repatriated. Still later, according to the report, they spread the allegation that the Unc wanted to move all faithful Communists into compounds away from the other prisoners so that the true Communists could be killed. The prisoners were further advised that if U.N. soldiers were

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to enter the compounds they would not be allowed to fire their weapons because it was against the Geneva Convention. All prisoners were told to concentrate in one place and fight the U.N. soldiers. "Each man kill one soldier before he is subdued." Any prisoners of war who might reveal information were to be killed and the blame was to be placed on the U.N. authorities.

Military administrative committees were established in all compounds under Communist control. These committees organized military units to enforce the plans and directives of the committees. "Peoples courts" were established to punish offenders who deviated from the party's policies or refused to join its militant organizations.

The leader of the political committee, or general leading headquarters, was Jeon Moon Il. Listed as a private in the NKA, he had been identified by his fellow prisoners as Pak Sang Hyon, one of the original 36 Soviet-Koreans, among whom were Kim Il Sung, Ho Kai, and Nam Il. These 36 were brought into North Korea by the Soviets in 1945 to organize the North Korean satellite state. Within the compounds Pak went by the code name of Ro Sun Saeng. Prisoners have stated he controlled all the compounds and personally ordered the capture of General Dodd. He also allegedly was responsible for instigating the riots against the screening for voluntary repatriation in compound 77 on 27 May 51 and 18 March 52. He issued instructions, directives and propaganda and sentenced to death many of the prisoners who dared to defy the party directives.

General leading headquarters issued all directives through the leading committee for party members. This committee was organized into political, organizational, military, and agitation sections. It was the special activity subsection of the military section which was responsible for punishing "by physical or other means all reactionary, destructive elements and spies who act in defiance of advice of party members, and who violate the party regulations and rebel against the fatherland and people." The members of this subsection were instructed to "perform their duties at the risk of their lives." They were the executioners or the strong-arm squads who punished, beat, and executed violators condemned by the clandestine "peoples courts." The study describes a number of the typically brutal activities of the "peoples courts."

The study points out that once the breadth and detail of the Communist prisoner-of-war plot were recognized, the U.N. Command moved to gain complete and uncontested control, dealing swiftly but fairly with all who would challenge the proper authority of the detaining power.

Once established, control was maintained by quick counteraction when required and supported by such additional measures as dispersion of prisoners into smaller and more manageable groups, provision of additional physical security

around compounds, expansion of intelligence systems covering the various compounds, and institution of a stricter regiment, more frequent inspections and searches as required.

It is realized, the study concludes, that neither these present measures nor any others permissible under the Geneva Convention will cause Pow leaders to abandon their fanatical devotion to communism or completely destroy the Communist organization within the compounds.

With communications reduced, coordination of incidents may be difficult, but leaders among the prisoners are well enough acquainted with the purposes and methods of the party and Communist army command to know without further instructions that incidents at any time can be exploited. Constant and close surveillance may deprive the prisoners of the advantage of surprise, but there can be no guarantee that control measures now in force will prevent the fanatical Communist leaders from throwing away the lives of those they dominate.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTY-FIFTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2898 [Excerpts]
Transmitted January 6, 1953

I herewith submit report number 55 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 October 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1389-1403 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice Negotiations continued in recess until 8 October in order to give the Communists ample time in which to study the new proposals for resolving the prisoner of war issue put forward by the United Nations Command on 28 September. The three alternative United Nations Command proposals submitted at that time had established beyond any possibility of refutation the fact that the United Nations Command would willingly repatriate every war prisoner who desired to return to Communist control, and provided absolute safeguards against the forcible retention of any prisoner. When the main delegations met on 8 October the Communists immediately stated that after careful study they found the new proposals unacceptable, and demanded total repatriation of all war prisoners. Simultaneously, with complete illogic, they repeated time after time the obviously false charge that the United Nations Command was attempting to forcibly retain prisoners of war.

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate then questioned the Communist spokesman to determine unequivocally if the Communists definitely rejected the United Nations Command proposals, and still insisted on total repatriation of all prisoners of war. In reply

the Communists stated that the United Nations Command proposals presented no new content, and that the principles represented had been rejected long ago. They maintained, as before, that international conventions and the present draft of the Armistice Agreement required the repatriation of all war prisoners, and must be adhered to.

The Communist Senior Delegate then urged the United Nations Command to carefully consider a proposal of the Communists which is repeated here as delivered by the Communists.

... with regard to the changes in form as suggested in your proposal, we are willing to give them serious consideration on the basis of the principle of total repatriation of war prisoners on both sides. We consider that when the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, all of the war prisoners of each side may be sent to the agreed exchange point in the Demilitarized Zone to be delivered to and received by the other side. Thereafter, through visits by the joint teams of the Red Cross Societies of both sides, the war prisoners will be insured to return home to lead a peaceful life and not to participate again in active hostilities in Korea. Classification of the war prisoners will be carried out thereafter in accordance with our July 18th principle of reclassification according to nationality and area. The captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the United Nations Forces must all be repatriated home. Of the captured personnel of the Korean People's Army, those whose homes are in North Korea must all be repatriated home while those others whose homes are in South Korea may return to South Korea. Of the captured personnel of the South Korean Army, those whose homes are in South Korea must all be repatriated home, while the others whose homes are in North Korea may return to North Korea. These tasks of visits, classification, and repatriation can be accomplished under the observance of inspection teams of neutral nations.

Since the Communist proposal obviously constituted no real change in the enemy position the United Nations Command Senior Delegate stated that it was clear that the Communists categorically rejected all United Nations Command proposals.²

After the recess commenced the liaison officers of both sides continued to meet for consultation and transaction

² The report here summarizes Gen. Harrison's Oct. 8 statement and quotes the last 4 paragraphs. For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 601.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Jan. 6. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 908; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883; the 50th report, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; and the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224.

of their customary duties. The Communist Senior Delegate promptly employed their services to transmit a letter of protest to the United Nations Command Senior Delegate regarding the recess. This letter, delivered on 11 October 1952, recognized in its opening sentence that a recess had been declared, but ended with a contradictory allegation that the United Nations Command was responsible for disrupting and breaking off the negotiations. The United Nations Command Senior Delegate has prepared a reply refuting this unwarranted charge by the Communists and restating the United Nations Command position with regard to the recess. This letter will be delivered through the liaison officers in the near future.

In a meeting of the liaison officers on 6 October a letter from the United Nations Command Senior Delegate to the Communist Senior Delegate was delivered. The text of this letter is quoted.

On 5 August I addressed a letter to you requesting that your side permit the receipt by our captured personnel in your custody of individual parcels or collective shipments of relief supplies. You will recall that we have offered to make similar arrangements for those members of your forces we now hold as prisoners of war.

On 27 August in the course of a plenary session of the delegation I again requested your agreement to this proposal, to which you replied that the matter was under study by your side.

With the approach of winter and the increase in hardships which colder weather will bring, we particularly desire to make available to our personnel some comforts which will assist them. I propose a specific plan for the shipment and exchange of individual parcels by both sides to be initiated as soon as possible, leaving for future consideration the shipment of collective supplies:

Parcels will be limited to four pounds in weight, with a maximum length of eighteen inches and with thirty-six inch maximum length and girth combined.

Each parcel will be addressed to an individual whose name has been included in lists exchanged by both sides or in subsequent lists submitted by each side for additional accounting.

Each prisoner of war will be permitted to receive a maximum of two parcels per month.

Contents of packages will be limited to articles described in Article 72 of the Geneva Convention.

Packages will be delivered to the representatives of both sides at Panmunjom in the same manner as prisoner of war mail.

I hope for an early and favorable reply to this request which has as its only objective some measure of relief for those unfortunate victims of war.

At the end of the period no reply of any kind to this request had been received from the Communists.

The series of open acts of defiance which occurred during the latter part of September at United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number Three, Cheju City, housing fanatical pro-Communist Chinese prisoners of war, were culminated on 1 October '52 by a carefully planned attempt at open rebellion.

In an attempt to restore order, two platoons forced their way into the compound at approximately 0825 hours and were immediately attacked by prisoners armed with rocks, spears, barbed wire flails and other hand-fashioned missiles. Divided into three groups the prisoners were fortified behind a partially constructed rock wall being built as part of a shower house. Firing ceased at 0835. Total casualties resulting from this incident were: fifty-six Prisoners of War dead, ninety-one injured and evacuated

to the Prisoner of War hospital at Pusan, and nine additional slightly injured. Nine United States troops were bruised by rocks or clubs.

As soon as a report of this incident was received, immediate steps were taken to provide transportation facilities for the press to Cheju City. Correspondents and photographers who arrived shortly after noon on 2 October were given factual information during a conference with the camp commander, and were given permission to question United States personnel involved. They took a number of photographs of crude weapons and prisoners of war in formation who were undergoing inspection. It is of particular interest to note that the inmates of this camp had been specifically warned the day previously that demonstrations celebrating Chinese Communist holidays during the period 1-3 October would not be permitted.

In the remainder of the camps under United Nations Command control no unusual incidents occurred during this period. New construction and improvement in existing facilities, including the furtherance of the winterization program went along well. With the implementation of Operation THANKSGIVING, in which some 11,000 South Korean civilian internees will be released during the month of October, by 13 October over 2,300 had been released to civilian authorities, and with the assistance of relief agencies of the United Nations Command, were being settled rapidly into the civilian economy.

The period opened with the enemy displaying the same degree of aggressiveness in ground operations which he had shown during September. During the second half of this period, however, the entire western and central portions of the battle line were the scene of some of the heaviest fighting in many months. This increased battle action was precipitated by the enemy during the night 6/7 October when hostile units of up to regimental strength struck a total of forty United Nations Command positions on the western and central fronts in what was the largest series of co-ordinated limited objective attacks attempted by the Communists in more than a year. Many positions changed hands, some repeatedly, as a result of this increased action. When the period closed the enemy at great cost had taken and still retained five of these positions, all of which were outpost positions. To herald the opening of this series of limited objective attacks the Communists unleashed the largest volume of artillery and mortar fire received by United Nations Command forces since the initiation of hostilities. Over 93,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on friendly positions on 7 October. The daily average for this period increased to 24,000 rounds per day, or more than twice that of the previous period. United Nations Command forces, in addition to defeating the enemy's vigorous limited objective at all but several minor points, continued to employ groups up to company size to provide patrols and raiding parties for combat intelligence and reconnaissance activities against the enemy. No major change in enemy dispositions took place. However, because of the extremely intense action at one point on the central front east of Mabang the enemy was forced to commit, unsuccessfully, the reserve division of one Chinese Communist Army.

Along the western front enemy activity centered in the area south and east of Punji and in the area south and east

of Sanguyong. Outpost positions and hill masses were the objectives of the attacking Red forces. In the Punji area on the night of 2 October six outposts were attacked by enemy forces up to two companies in strength. Action in one instance lasted for nine hours. Five of these positions were lost to the Communists but two of them were reoccupied the following day. During the night of 6/7 October the Communists initiated a total of thirty-one actions across the western front, ranging from squad size probes to a regimental strength attack against a terrain feature four miles east and south of Mabang. As a result of these various actions five positions were lost to the enemy. Activity, although diminishing in intensity, continued sporadically for the ensuing several days with counterattacks being made by both friendly and Communist forces in an effort to gain and hold outposts in the Sanguyong area. As the period drew to a close Communist action had dwindled to brief, ineffective probes by small hostile elements. As of the end of the period four outpost positions which had been lost to the enemy attacks of 3/7 October remained under hostile control.

Along the central portion of the battle line, Communist interest was focused on only one area as the period opened. In a continuation of action which had commenced on 29 September the Communists made two company strength attacks against an outpost position one and a half miles southeast of Kumsong. The first attack, which was launched during the early morning hours of 1 October, was repulsed after a two and one-half hour engagement which included hand-to-hand fighting. The same evening the enemy was again forced to withdraw after an unsuccessful attack of one-hour duration. With the exception of a few brief scattered probes the enemy was inactive until the night of 6/7 October. The central front then received its share of the series of co-ordinated attacks made by the Communist forces. Thirteen separate actions were initiated including one in regimental strength and six by hostile battalions. During this series of actions an outpost six miles south and west of Pyonggang was lost to the Reds. This position was retaken, lost again and finally regained and held by friendly elements at noon of 8 October. Also during the night of 6/7 October the Communists occupied a hill mass one and a half miles southeast of Yulsa and a portion of another ridge located three thousand yards to the east. These same positions had been the targets for enemy attacks at various times during the month of September. United Nations Command units later retook the ridge position referred to above on 13 October. The heaviest fighting took place at the western end of the central front where a bitterly fought contest still continues over a hill mass seven miles east of Mabang. This action opened, as did many others, during the night of 6/7 October. The hill, dubbed "Whitehorse", has been taken and lost by both sides almost daily as United Nations Command and Communist battalions stormed up the slopes to gain and hold the position. The Communists employed, in succession, major elements of five separate regiments in their determined bid for control of the hill mass. Three of these hostile regiments were drawn from a reserve Chinese Communist Division. Employing human-sea tactics the Communist Commanders, as one attacking regiment became

depleted, committed regiment after regiment into the action. Prisoners of war and battlefield reports clearly reveal the unusually heavy punishment inflicted on the attacking units by the gallant Republic of Korea defenders. Prisoners also reflect a continued determination to seize this hill mass; however, at last reports, United Nations Command elements remained on the position. On 14 October United Nations Command forces, in a co-ordinated attack to secure more advantageous positions, compelled two enemy battalions to relinquish their hold on two hill positions three miles northeast of Kumhwa. After dark on the same date a Communist counterattack carried the positions and necessitated a friendly withdrawal. On 15 October a renewed offensive by United Nations Command elements succeeded in retaking and securing the hills after initial stubborn resistance. All subsequent Communist assaults against these positions were successfully contained as United Nations Command defenders remained in firm possession at the close of the period.

Along the eastern portion of the front enemy action was relatively insignificant. Only one position, a United Nations Command outpost approximately three miles south and east of Mulguji, was the focal point of Communist activity. Here numerous attacks and counterattacks by platoon size elements of both sides took place as ownership of the position changed almost daily. At last report the outpost was in friendly hands. Elsewhere across the eastern front activity consisted of brief Communist probes, mostly in squad strength, all of which were repulsed.

A study of enemy activity before, during, and immediately following the series of co-ordinated attacks revealed few general offensive indications and a predominance of basic defensive indications. Therefore, it is concluded that this series of attacks were limited objective attacks. Some of the reasons for launching these attacks, as indicated by several prisoner of war reports, were believed to be: (1) a display of Communist strength and firepower motivated by a fear of a United Nations Command offensive; (2) spoiling attacks designed to keep United Nations Command forces off balance and in a defensive attitude in case the United Nations Command should be preparing for large-scale offensive action; and (3) an effort to seize certain terrain features considered important from a tactical viewpoint and for negotiatory advantage at the Panmunjon Conference. Whether one or all of these considerations motivated the hostile limited offensive, it must certainly now be clear, even to the lowest rank and file enemy soldier, that the Communist effort was not only costly but a complete failure. This failure should vividly illustrate to the Communist hierarchy the price that they must pay in any contemplated general offensive.

United Nations Command naval jet and propeller driven aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck pre-briefed targets and targets of opportunity throughout central and north Korea. Enemy troop concentrations and supply areas received the major attention of naval aircraft during this period. Strikes were launched almost daily against enemy transportation facilities, buildings and warehouses of military significance. Four major effort strikes were launched. First, sixty-nine

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United Nations Command Navy planes hit a North Korean troop concentration and supply area. Second, a joint United Nations Command Navy-Air Force strike was conducted against an enemy troop concentration and supply area at Hoeryang. Third, a joint United Nations Command Navy-Air Force strike was made against an enemy supply area at Yongpyong-ni. Fourth, a joint United Nations Command Navy-Air Force strike attacked Kowon, a major railway and road hub, and supply center. Other heavy strikes were also launched against enemy supply areas and troop concentrations in the Wonsan area. United Nations Command naval aircraft close air support sorties for front line troops destroyed many bunkers and gun positions, and inflicted numerous casualties among enemy troops. The highlight of the close support work occurred on 9 October when ninety-one Navy planes supported United Nations Command front line troops, using a newly developed ground-air co-ordinated strike technique against dug-in enemy troops. Observed results consisted of one troop shelter, six buildings, and 100 yards of trenches destroyed, and direct hits on ten bunkers. Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in many railcuts, destruction or damage to railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, railroad cars, trucks and boats. A number of MIG-15s were encountered in the Wonsan area during this period and two Navy fighters were shot down as a result of MIG encounters.

Off the west coast of Korea, Marine Corps and Navy carrier-based aircraft continued air strikes on enemy military targets south and west of a line between Hanchon and Kaesong. Close air support missions for United Nations Command troops were also flown. The interdiction planes concentrated on troop dispositions threatening friendly-held islands, supply areas, road traffic, boats, and rail and road cuts. The prolonged effort to cut the enemy main supply routes has borne fruit and the West Coast Task Element Commander stated on 6 October that the enemy's past policy of rebuilding destroyed rail bridges has almost ceased, but that oxcart and sampan traffic has increased in the area. Aircraft sighted four groups of MIG-15 aircraft near Chinnampo on 6 October but no engagement ensued. One fighter plane crashed in the Yellow Sea, probably as a result of enemy ground fire, and the pilot is listed as missing in action.

Marine Corps aircraft based ashore in Korea continued to support United Nations Command front line troops and fly strike and reconnaissance missions over North Korea.

Naval patrol planes supported the United Nations effort in Korea by daily flights which included reconnaissance, anti-submarine, and weather data missions conducted over the waters adjoining Korea.

On the east coast of Korea the naval blockade units, led by the United Nations Command flagship with United Nations Command cruisers and destroyers assigned, besieged key enemy strong points at Songjin, Hungnam, and Wonsan, and interdicted the coastal road and rail lines. Minesweepers worked daily within range of enemy coastal guns to keep mines clear of the ships on blockade and patrol duties. In the East Coast bomblane vicinity, United Nations Command vessels supported the friendly troops ashore on a round the clock basis.

Enemy shore batteries along the east coast of Korea continued to harass United Nations Command ships. During the first thirteen days of October over 250 rounds of 76mm and 105mm ammunition were expended by North Korean shore batteries and two United Nations Command ships suffered damage. Near Songjin a 76mm shore battery scored an airburst on a Canadian destroyer. Two personnel were killed, eight were wounded, and the ship suffered superficial superstructure damage but continued her blockade duties. A minesweeper operating off Kojo received minor shrapnel damage from near misses made by a 76mm battery, and four of her crew were wounded.

On the Korean west coast United Nations Command surface craft blockaded the Korean coastline around the perimeter of the Hwanghae Province. The vessels successfully defended the friendly-held islands north of the 38th Parallel by maintaining constant watch and harassing troop positions on the mainland.

Small United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols, blockaded, and swept mines in waters off enemy shores. A new patrol was established by the United Nations Command Blockading and Escort Force Commander to warn unauthorized vessels out of waters adjacent to South Korea.

United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract, provided personnel lift and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Korea.

United Nations Command aircraft continued to attack enemy supply targets to destroy the enemy's war-making potential. An intensified operation, which was made possible by the availability of additional aircraft and favorable maintenance conditions, was begun during the period. Approximately 250 sorties per day were scheduled over the normal rate to increase the destruction of enemy material. Fighter bombers concentrated on the area south of a line between Pyongyang and Wonsan where supply targets, fuel dumps and troop concentrations were attacked daily by large formations of Air Force and Marine aircraft. Returning pilots reported destruction of warehouses, supply stacks, and other lucrative targets.

On 12 October United Nations Command aircraft flew a total of 1,428 sorties, the second highest mark reached during any twenty-four-hour period since the beginning of the war. On this date and the day following, 590 close support sorties were flown by fighter bombers and light bombers. Increased ground activity necessitated additional close support missions, particularly in the central sector. Destruction claims from these and other sorties during the period, included many bunkers and gun positions, and numerous casualties inflicted on enemy troops.

Counter-air sorties by United Nations Command jet interceptors continued to take a terrific toll of Communist MIG aircraft but the destruction claims fell far short of the record set during the first part of September. United Nations Command fighters shot down eighteen Red MIGs during the reporting period and damaged an additional twenty. Pilots reported that the enemy pilots were not aggressive unless the odds were decidedly in their favor.

The MIG pilots took advantage of cloud cover and the Manchurian border to escape from United Nations Command planes. The enemy still used his hit and run tactics against United Nations Command interceptors and slower fighter bombers but was unwilling to fight prolonged battles with the faster jet types.

On three occasions during the period, MIGs made attacks on propeller-driven United Nations Command aircraft operating in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. On 12 October, an Air Force aircraft on an armed reconnaissance mission west of Wonsan was destroyed by MIGs and the United Nations Command pilot was listed as missing in action.

These attacks by MIGs, in the eastern sector of Korea, brought about a change in the use of United Nations Command interceptor aircraft. United Nations Command jet fighters were scheduled on airborne patrol missions between the Chongchon River and the Wonsan area. These missions were flown throughout the daylight hours with four aircraft constantly in the area.

Air Intelligence was unable to draw any unusual conclusions from the operation of the enemy jets but indications are that the sporadic raids by MIGs represent only a token force and do not in any way reflect the total capability.

The medium bombers contributed to the program of increased destruction of supplies and equipment by attacking supply areas at Sopo-ri, Naewonsan-ni, Haechong, Ponchongol, Yonpo and other areas where supply buildings were destroyed, fuel and ammunition dumps blown up, and storage areas destroyed.

The largest medium bomber strike of the period was accomplished in a night attack on targets on the Haeju Peninsula. The primary target was a headquarters area for guerrilla training units operating from Haeju and the surrounding area. The day after the bomber attack, fighter bomber aircraft attacked the same area to destroy smaller targets not hit by the medium bombers.

The medium bombers flew frequent sorties in close support of United Nations Command ground units and bombed targets with the aid of radar equipment. They also flew regular leaflet missions, dropping millions of leaflets.

Light bombers were utilized primarily on night intruder missions and night attacks on supply targets. The number of vehicles sighted during the period decreased from the previous period although on the night of 12/13 October, 3,000 vehicles were sighted. A large percentage of these vehicles were attacked and a good number were destroyed by the night intruders and Marine night fighters. Several trains were destroyed during the period with the majority of the sightings in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. As a result additional night intruder aircraft patrolled the main routes on the east coast searching for rail traffic.

Combat cargo aircraft performed normal logistical missions transporting troops and equipment in support of combat operations. Meanwhile, rescue units accomplished recovery of three United Nations Command pilots who had parachuted from disabled aircraft behind enemy lines. These rescue missions were all flown within range of enemy MIG fighters, but the recovery operations were not subjected to enemy air attacks.

All United Nations Command Air Force units participated in a joint operation which was begun on the final day of the reporting period but details of the operation were not available for this report.

Employing radio, leaflets, and loudspeakers, maximum dissemination was given the 28 September proposal of the Senior United Nations Command Delegate to the armistice negotiations. The significance of this and other United Nations Command efforts to achieve a realistic peace in Korea had been seriously distorted by Communist leaders in their rigidly controlled indoctrination of troops and civilians. Radio broadcasts of recorded statements by Communist prisoners of war presented dramatic testimony to the terror which repatriation holds for many prisoners. Communist obstruction of peace in an effort to obtain forcible repatriation of these men was stressed. Psychological warfare media continued the extensive program of warnings to civilians in areas where targets of United Nations Command bombings are located.

Wage scales have been adjusted for direct-hire Korean workers employed by the United Nations forces to compensate for the increased cost of living. The Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone, has been authorized to take certain actions to provide wages at levels prevailing in private industry for the same classifications of work and to insure co-ordinated and uniform treatment of all direct-hire employees of the several military commands, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the American Embassy. In conformance with the common practice in Korea, wages will be paid in won, issues-in-kind and services.

A preliminary survey of crop growing conditions and areas planted to rice and supplemental crops was conducted by a joint United Nations Command-Republic of Korea survey team during the period 29 August to 11 September. This was the first of two surveys to be conducted to determine the extent of presently planted areas and to estimate the probable yield of these areas at fall harvest time. The results of the second survey, scheduled for mid-October, will be used as a basis for determining the total food and grain import requirements for the Korean food year 1 November 1952 to 31 October 1953.

Definite steps are being taken by the United Nations Command to assist in improving the facilities for medical education in the Republic of Korea. Following the completion of a recent survey of Republic of Korea medical educational facilities by United Nations Command medical and educational advisors, certain recommendations were presented to President Rhee. To this end the United Nations Command has suggested and agreed to the relocation of certain United Nations Command advisory groups and medical units in order to free the space now occupied by the 1st Republic of Korea Hospital in Taegu Medical College. This particular change is considered to be of primary importance since it will not only return the buildings to the college but it will provide for the transfer of faculty members, nurses and students from Pusan, thus relieving the overcrowded conditions of the combined medical schools located here. In addition it will be the first step toward establishing a valuable medical center.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Economic and Social Council (OAS)

The Department of State announced on February 6 (press release 69) that John M. Cabot, personal representative of the Secretary of State, will be the delegate of the U.S. Government at the third extraordinary meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States, which will convene at Caracas on February 9, 1953.

The other members of the U.S. delegation are as follows:

Alternate Delegates

Merwin L. Bohan, U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Julian C. Greenup, Acting U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Advisers

Willis C. Armstrong, Deputy Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

Edward G. Cale, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

James C. Corliss, Adviser, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Mrs. Elizabeth S. Enochs, Chief, International Technical Mission, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Rafael Pico, Chairman, Puerto Rico Development Board, Santurce, Puerto Rico

William H. Wynne, Financial Adviser, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Executive Secretary

Henry E. Allen, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Press Officer

Joseph F. McEvoy, First Secretary of Embassy, Caracas

The purpose of each extraordinary meeting is to enable the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to review the work it accomplished during the preceding year; to examine the plans for future action; and, in general, to consider any other topic of common interest to the member states, within the jurisdiction of the Council. In the light of the latest information on the most characteristic problems and on the economic, financial, and social conditions of the American countries, delegates to the third extraordinary meeting will review the Council's work program and the priorities to be assigned to various activities during 1953-54.

Among other subjects to be considered during the forthcoming meeting by delegations from the 21 American Republics are topics concerning current economic problems, including coordination

of transportation and materials in short supply; economic policy and development and monetary stability; and social problems, such as population movements, community organization, workers education, social insurance, and low-cost housing. The meeting will also examine the program of technical cooperation of the Organization of American States (OAS), under which projects are now being carried out in the fields of housing research, hoof-and-mouth disease, the administration of children's services, economic and financial statistics, cooperatives, and technical education for the improvement of agricultural and rural life.

Economic Commission for Asia (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 6 (press release 72) that the U.S. Government is represented at the ninth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, which convened at Bandung, Indonesia on February 6 by the following delegation:

U.S. Representative

Merrill C. Gay, Minister, Economic Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Advisers

Eugene M. Braderman, Director, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Augustus S. Chase, Chief, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State

William W. Diehl, Financial Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo

Howard L. Parsons, Economic Officer and Attaché, American Embassy, Bangkok

Rufus Burr Smith, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Karachi

Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of North Asian Affairs, Department of State

Secretary of Delegation

Frederick D. Hunt, Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Djakarta

The principal purposes of ECAFE are to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for economic reconstruction in the countries of Asia and the Far East, for raising the level of economic activity in those countries, and for maintaining and strengthening their economic relations, both among themselves and with other countries of the world; to make or sponsor investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and developments within territories of Asia and the Far East; and to undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of economic, technological, and statistical information.

Statistical Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 3 (press release 63) that Stuart A. Rice, U.S. representative on the Statistical Commission

of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, is attending the seventh session of the Commission, which convened at New York on February 2, 1953. Mr. Rice is assistant director in charge of statistical standards, Bureau of the Budget. He is being assisted by the following advisers:

Harry Venneman, Principal Adviser, Economist, Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget
Maxwell R. Conklin, Chief, Industry Division, Bureau of the Census
J. Edward Ely, Chief, Foreign Trade Division, Bureau of the Census
Payton Stapp, Assistant Chief, Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget

During the seventh session the participants will discuss a number of questions basic to the improvement of the international comparability of statistics, including the principles for statistics of external trade, definitions for industrial statistics, concepts and definitions of statistics, principles for a vital statistics system, a system of wholesale price statistics, and standards to be used in the development and reporting of national income statistics. A review will be made during this session of recommendations for the improvement of international migration statistics, a Secretariat paper on the development of various branches of social statistics, and the report of the Subcommittee on Statistical Sampling. Participants in the seventh session will also study a general survey of developments in national and international statistics, prepared in response to a request made by the Commission at its sixth session for an overall report on the status of international statistical activities, in connection with the assignment of priorities to the work programs of the Commission. Among other subjects referred to in the provisional agenda are balance-of-payments statistics, manual on money and banking statistics, censuses of distribution, construction statistics, living standards, transport statistics, customs areas, construction of price and quantity indices in national accounting, and insurance statistics.

Committee on Industry and Trade (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on January 26 (press release 43) that at the fifth session of the Committee on Industry and Trade of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which will convene at Bandung, Indonesia, on January 26, the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation:

Chairman

Merrill C. Gay, Minister, Economic Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Advisers

Eugene M. Braderman, Director, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
William W. Diehl, Financial Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo

Howard L. Parsons, Economic Officer and Attaché, American Embassy, Bangkok
Rufus Burr Smith, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Karachi

Secretary of Delegation

Frederick D. Hunt, Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Djakarta

To be considered by the Committee at its forthcoming session are agenda items relating to activities in the field of mineral-resources development in the area; the present and potential volume of trade between the ECAFE countries and the countries of Europe; trade promotion activities of the Committee secretariat; and financial aspects of economic-development programming. The Committee will review reports on the electric-power resources and needs of the area; shortages of trained personnel which are handicapping certain fields of economic development; improved methods of using indigenous regional materials in housing and building; cottage and small-scale industries, particularly in textiles, and handicraft marketing; and the mobilization of domestic capital for the economic development of the region.

A detailed summary of the Committee's discussions of these matters, together with its recommendations for future activities in the field of industry and trade in the region, will be submitted to the ninth session of ECAFE, which is scheduled to convene in Bandung on February 6.

Transport and Communications Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 2 (press release 61) that at the sixth session of the Transport and Communications Commission of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, which convened at New York on that date, George P. Baker, professor of transportation, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., will head the U.S. delegation in his capacity of U.S. representative on the Commission. He will be assisted by the following advisers:

Adviser

Henry H. Kelly, Chief, Inland Transport Policy Staff, Department of State

Ad Hoc Advisers

Herbert Ashton, Transport and Communications Division, Office of Transportation, Department of Commerce
Edmund H. Kellogg, Officer in Charge, U.N. Economic Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
Robert T. Merrill, Capt. U.S.C.G. (retired), Executive Secretary, Shipping Coordinating Committee, Department of State
Jerome Sachs, Chief, Insurance Staff, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

The Transport and Communications Commission assists the Economic and Social Council in all matters concerned with the international trans-

portation of goods and persons. At its forthcoming session, participants will consider items relating to the question of a uniform system of road signs and signals, the report of a U.N. Committee of Experts on Licensing of Motor Vehicle Drivers, and customs formalities for the temporary importation of private vehicles and for tourism. They will also review a report on various aspects of the transport of dangerous goods, especially those which are considered suitable for uniform international attention at this time; consider certain maritime matters, including the ratifications of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the unification of maritime tonnage measurement, and the pollution of sea water by oil; and review a number of Secretariat reports on matters in the field of international transport and communications. The Commission will transmit to the Economic and Social Council a report containing a summary of the discussion on the various agenda items, a review of the Commission's past activities and accomplishments, the problems which are expected to continue in the future, and the texts of the resolutions adopted at this session of the Commission.

Textiles Committee (ILO)

The Department of State announced on February 2 (press release 62) that the U.S. delegation at the fourth session of the Textiles Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which meets at Geneva February 2-14, 1953, is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Mrs. Mary Hilton, Chief, Research Division, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.
A. Henry Thurston, Director, Textiles Division, National Production Authority, Washington, D. C.

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

William F. Sullivan, President, National Association of Cotton Manufacturers, Boston, Mass.
Edwin Wilkinson, Executive Vice President, National Association of Wool Manufacturers, New York, N. Y.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Louis Stulberg, Vice President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, New York, N. Y.

Delegates at this session of the Textiles Committee will discuss special problems affecting the employment of women in the textile industry, including (a) recruitment, vocational training, and opportunities for the promotion of women in the textile industry; and (b) problems relating to equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value. Various aspects of the question of a guaranteed wage for workers in the textile industry will be considered. In addition, the delegates will review a general report, prepared

by the International Labor Office, covering (1) action taken in the various countries in the light of the conclusions of the previous sessions of the Committee; (2) steps taken by the Office to follow up the studies and inquiries proposed by the Committee; and (3) recent trends and developments in the textile industry.

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmations

Walter B. Smith

The Senate on February 6 confirmed Walter Bedell Smith as Under Secretary of State.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

Winthrop W. Aldrich

The Senate on February 2 confirmed Winthrop W. Aldrich as Ambassador to Great Britain.

James B. Conant

The Senate on February 6 confirmed James B. Conant as U. S. High Commissioner for Germany.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 2-Feb. 7, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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61	2/2	Transport and communications (Ecosoc)
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63	2/3	Statistical commission (Ecosoc)
64	2/3	German employee claims
†65	2/3	Andrews: U.S. and underdeveloped areas
*66	2/4	Exchange of persons
67	2/5	U.S., U.K. to discuss economic matters
†68	2/5	Unpaid claims against Cuba
69	2/6	Inter-American Economic, Social Council
70	2/6	Tube wells in India
*71	2/6	Department employment policy
72	2/6	Economic commission for Asia (ECAFE)
73	2/7	Conant: Oath of office statement

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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